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Abstract 
The European Union has been engaged since 1989 in a programme to develop tri ti-
um breeding blankets for application in a fusion power reactor. There are four 
blanket concepts under developmcnt. Two of them use Iithium ceramics, the other 
two concepts employ an eu tcctic Iead-lithium alloy (Pb-17Li) as breeder material. 
The two most promising concepts were to select in 1995 for further development. 
In order to prepare the selection, a Blanket Concept Sclection Exercise (BCSE) has 
been initiated by the participating associations under the auspices of the European 
Commission. This BCSE has been performed in 14 working groups which, in a 
comparativc cvaluation of the four blankct concepts, addressed specific fields. The 
working group safety addresscd the safety implications. 
This report describes the methodology adoptcd, the safety issues identified, their 
comparative evaluation for thc four concepts, and the results and conclusions of the 
working group to be entered into the overall evaluation. There, thc results from all 
14 working groups have been combined to yield a final ranking as a basis for the 
selection. Jn summary, the safcty assessment showed that the four European blan-
ket concepts can be considered as equivalent in terms of the safety rating adopted, 
each concept, however, rendering safety concerns of different quality in different 
areas which are substantiated in this report. 
Abstract 
Ein Sicherheitsvergleich der europäischen Blanketkonzepte fiir einen 
DEM 0 Fusionsreaktor 
Kurzfassung 
Im Fusionsprogramm der Europäischen Union werden seit 1989 tritiumbrütende 
Blankets für den Einsatz in Fusionsreaktoren entwickelt. Bislang befanden sich vier 
Varianten in der näheren Untersuchung, nämlich je zwei Varianten mit festem kera-
mischem Brutstoff und zwei mit flüssigem Brutstoff, der eutektischen Blei-Lithium-
Verbindung Pb-17Li. Aus den vier Konzepten wurden im Jahre 1995 zwei Varian-
ten für die weitere Entwicklung ausgewählt. 
Die Auswahl wurde in einer Studie vorbereitet, dem sogenannten Blanket-Auswahl-
verfahren (englisch: Blanket Concept Selection Exercise, BCSE), an der die in der 
Blanketentwicklung beteiligten Assoziationen und Industriegruppen sowie die Euro-
päische Kommission mitwirkten. Die BCSE wurde in vierzehn Arbeitsgruppen 
durchgeführt, in denen die vier Konzepte nach vorgegebenen Themen und Kriterien 
bewertet wurden. Die Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit behandelte die Sicherheitsaspekte. 
In diesem Bericht werden die angewandte Methode, die identifizierten Sicherheits-
Schwerpunkte, der Vergleich der vier Blanketkonzepte bezüglich dieser Schwer-
punkte, sowie die Ergebnisse und Schlußfolgerungen der Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit 
beschrieben. Die Ergebnisse gingen in die Endbewertung ein, in der die Resultate 
aller vierzehn Arbeitsgruppen zu einer gesamten Rangfolge zusammengefaSt wur-
den. In der Summe ergab die sicherheitstechnische Bewertung der vier europäischen 
Blanketkonzepte keine erheblichen Unterschiede. Die Konzepte zeigen jedoch unter-
schiedliche Qualität in der Einzelbewertung der Sicherheitsaspekte, die im Bericht 
herausgestellt werden. 
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1. Introduction 
Tbc European Union (EU) has bccn engaged since 1989 in a programme to develop 
tritium brccding blankcts for application in a fusion power reactor. There are four 
conccpts under development [1 ], [2], [3], [ 4]. Two of these blanket concepts use 
Iithium ceramies as breeder material, helium as coolant, and bcryllium as neutron 
multiplicr. The other two conccpts employ an eutectic Iead-lithium alloy (Pb-l7Li) 
as brccder material, cooled eithcr by circulating the liquid brceder material itself to 
extcrnal heat exchangers or by an extra water systcm. 
A common basis for the DEMO blankets has been specified by the Test blanket 
Advisory Group (TAG) [5] witb the aim to select the two most promising concepts 
in 1995 for further developmenl. In ordcr to prepare tbe selection, a Blanket Con-
cept Selection Excrcise (BCSE) has bcen initiated by the participating associations 
undcr the auspices of the Europcan Commission. This BCSE has been pcrformed in 
14 working groups which, in a comparative evaluation of the four blanket concepts, 
addressed specific ficlds, i.e., dcsign, neutronics, tritium, loops, maintenance, safety, 
reliability, MHD, coatings, brccdcrs, bcryllium, developmcnt risk, compatibility 
with ITER, and costs. 
The working group 6a (WG6a) asscsscd the safety implications and this report doc-
umcnts the methodology adoptcd and the results of WG6a to be entered into the 
overall cvaluation. Therc, the rcsults from all 14 working groups were combined by 
thc Blanket Co-ordination Group (BCG) to yield a final ranking of the concepts as 
a basis for the selcction. 
In this report a brief characterisation of the four blanket concepts under consider-
ation is given in Chapter 2 with background information collected in Appendix B. 
The applied methodology in thc safety assessment, which was set by the BCG to be 
used by any working group, is outlined in Chapter 3. According to these rules safe-
ty issues and their relative importance were identificd (Chapter 4 and Appendix A), 
against which the four conccpts could be evaluated (Chapter 5). The results and 
future developments (areas requiring further R&D) are reported in Chapter 6 with 
conclusions summarised in Chapter 7. 
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2. Brief Description of Blanket Concepts 
The four European blanket concepts undcr consideration are named throughout 
this report as follows. 
ßlanket Concept Acronyms ----------------------. 
BIT Breeder inside tubc (helium cooled solid brceder blanket) 
BOT Breeder outside tubc (helium cooled solid brceder blanket) 
DC Dual coolant (self-cooled liquid meta! breeder blanket with helium 
coolcd first wall) 
WC Water cooled (watcr cooled liquid breeder blanket) 
The concepts are characterised by the type of materials employed as breeder, coo-
lant, and multiplier as indicatcd in Table I on page 4 and their principal design is 
summarised below. Specific background information relevant to evaluating the dif-
ferent issucs is also provided in the issues evaluation tables in chapter 5 on page 21 
and in the data sheets in Appendix B on page 65. Piease refer to the original re-
ports [1 ], [2], [3], and [ 4] for further details, in particular for the rationale of the 
different choices made by the conccpt designers. 
BIT The breeder inside tube conccpt is characterised by longitudinal (poloidal) 
modules arranged in a hexagonal array inside the blanket box (Figure 1 
on page 79 and Figure 2 on page 80). The modules in turn consist of 
several staggcred tubcs and rods serving as coolant confinement (high-
pressure helium), as coolant flow channels, and as breeder (LiA102 or, 
alternatively, Li2Zr03 pellets) and multiplier (beryllium blocks) cladding. 
The first wall is cooled by a separate helium cooling system. The major 
safety concern is the !arge beryllium inventory. 
BOT In the breeder outside tube concept both the brceder (Li4Si04) and multi-
plier (bcryllium) matcrials are used in form of small pebbles, arranged in 
radial-toroidal layers, separated by cooling plates (Figure 3 on page 81 
and Figure 4 on pagc 82). The coolant is high-pressure helium which is 
circulated in series, at first through the channels of the first wall struc-
ture and subsequently through the cooling plates. The major safety con-
cern is, as with BIT, the !arge beryllium inventory. 
DC In thc dual coolant conccpt the liquid meta! brceder material (Pb-17Li) is 
cooling and tritium transpurt system at the same time. For this purpose 
it is circulated at a sufficient flow rate to carry away the bulk of thc gen-
erated heat and to extract the tritium in special triple fluid 
(Pb-17Li/NaKjwater) steam generators. For reasons of MHD effects the 
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heavily loaded first wall is cooled by an extra high-pressure helium cool-
ing system. The use of two coolants gave the concept the name. Safety 
concerns are the chcmical activity of the liquid metals. On the other 
hand, the design (Figure S on pagc 83 and Figure 6 on page 84) is com-
parably simple. 
WC The configuration of the water cooled liquid meta! breeder blanket con-
cept (Figure 7 on page 85 and Figure 8 on page 86) resembles in the 
midplane cross section thc Iayout of the DC concept. It circumvents the 
MHD problems by introducing an array of longitudinal (poloidal) coo-
Iant tubes in which high-pressure water removes the bulk of the gener-
ated heat. Likewise, the first wall is cooled by a separate water cooling 
system. The liquid meta! is circulated at very low flow rates, sufficient for 
tritium extraction in external units. Safety conccrns are associated with 
the combination of water and liquid metal in the same component. 
Table 1. Materials used in the four EU DEMO blanket concepts 
Coolant 
Breeder Multiplier Type Associ-
for for ation 
Breeder First Wall 
LiAl02 helium helium Be BIT CEA/ (Li2Zr03) blocks ENEA 
Li4Si04 helium helium Be BOT FZK pebbles 
Pb-17Li Pb-17Li hclium Pb-17Li DC FZK 
Pb-17Li water water Pb-17Li wc CEA 
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3. Safety Assessment Methodology 
Thc procedure for thc concept cvaluation methodology was established by the Blan-
ket Co-ordination Group, dcrivcd from a number of proposals discussed in the dif-
ferent working groups. This schcme was meant to be used for the overall evaluation 
but it was recommcndcd to also be used by the individual working groups. The 
safety group (WG6a) employecl the proposed scheme (with minor modifications as 
indicated), which consists of thc following six steps in the safety assessment: 
STEP 1 
In thc first step all safety issues that are relevant to the assessment of the four blan-
ket concepts have been identified (Table 4 on page 19). For details see Chapter 4 
on page 9. 
STEP 2 
In the second step, the scale has been defined to be used in the evaluation of the 
concepts for each issue. The scalc running from -2 to 0 has becn selected with the 
rating interpretation as illustratcd in the right column of Table 2. 
Table 2. Proposed and chosen rating scale and interpretation for the evalu-
ation of each concept 
Proposed rating interpretation 
Rating Chosen interpretation 
Scale in WG6a 
1. Option 2. Option 
+2 much better than avcr- no problems or very not used 
age well suited 
+1 better than average weil suited not used 
0 average not relevant or not ap- no problems plicable 
-0.5 - - minor problems 
-1 worse than averagc some pro blems some problems 
-1.5 - - substantial problems 
-2 much worse than avcr- considerable problems considerable problems 
age or not suitable or not suitable 
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Note: The chosen scale and interpretation differ from the proposal made by the 
BCG which uses the range from -2 to + 2 and, hence, includes positive inter-
pretations. It was feit that the safety issues, by definition, cause more or less 
severe concerns in all of the concepts and should, thcrefore, not be rated po-
sitive. Furthermore, the chosen range from -2 to 0 has the advantage over 
thc symmetric range from -2 to + 2 in that positive and negative ratings of 
individual issues don't cancel out. Thus, the absolute values of the sum of 
the weighted ratings pertaining to each concept (steps 4 and 6) become larg-
er, thereby avoiding a scatter of these sums (the overall safety ratings) 
around the null line. The symmetric range from -2 to + 2, on the other 
hand, would have suggested a clear (but yet artificial) distinction between 
good and bad. 
STEP 3 
The third step was the definition of the scale to be used for the weighting of each 
issue. The weighting factors on a scale from 0 to 10 with the following interpreta-
tion were used, in agreement with the BCG proposal. 
Table 3. Safety issues weighting factor interpretation 
Weighting Interpretation Factor 
10 extremely im portan t 
8 very important 
6 above average importance 
5 average importance 
4 below average importance 
2 of minor im portance 
0 no importance 
STEP4 
In the fourth step the weighting factors, Fi, were determined to be applied to each 
of the issues identified in step I (for details see Chapter 4 on page 9). 
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STEP 5 
The fifth step was the evaluation of the concepts against cach of the issues, using 
the rating scale established in step 2. This is described in detail in Chapter 5 on 
page 21. 
STEP 6 
This step involves the arithmetic procedure to arrive at an overall safety rating 
(OSR) for each concept (j). The following equation is used: 
(1) 
whcre 
OSRj = overall safcty rating for concept j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
RiJ = rating of concept j against issue i according to step 5 
Fi = weighting factor of issue i according to step 4 (i = I, 2, ... , 23) 
The overall safety ratings, OSRj are, by definition, negative values. They can be 
normalised to give positive values on a scale from 0 to + l using equation 2. 
where 
OSRj 
OSij = 1 - -----
(- 2) LFi (2) 
i 
= normalised overall safety rating for concept j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
= theoretically worst rating the concept could obtain on the chosen 
scale from -2 to 0. 
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4. Safety Issues ldentification and Weighting Factors 
The list of safety issues and thc application of weighting factors presented in this 
Chaptcr (Table 4 on page 19) have been arrived at by consensus in the first meet-
iq.g of working group 6a with participation of the thrce working group members 
(authors of this rcport) and spccialists from other working groups [6]. 23 issues 
wcre finally formulated with tbe weighting factors of between 4 and 10 (and an av-
eragc of 6.6) as dcscribed in 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
4.1 Identification of safety issues 
Tbe govcrning safety objective is to protect humans and environmcnt from hazards 
arising primarily from radioactivc material. This mcans in practical terms: controll= 
ing the power (e.g., overpower, disruptions), cooling in-vcssel components (afterheat 
removal from structures, breeder and multiplier materials), confining the radioactive 
material (tritium and other activation products in normal and abnormal situations), 
and minimising radioactive wastc (especially high=lcvel and long-term waste). 
In ordcr to achieve this goal, a scrics of physical barriers and several strategic Ievels 
of protection will have to be im plemented in a fusion plant. Generally three phys-
ical barriers are envisaged: (1) thc vacuum vessel or coolant boundary confining 
most of thc radioactivity in first wall surface materials (including sputtered particles 
and dust) and fluids, (2) the sccondary confinement enveloping all components that 
establish the first barrier, and (3) the outer building as third barrier providing cont-
rolled atmosphere in rooms located between the second and third boundary. ( 4) In 
addition, for the radioactivity contained in solid materials, like in in-vessel compo-
nent structures, breeding materials and multiplier materials (if solid), the matrix of 
these structures can be viewed as a fourth barrier ( or innermost barrier if seen from 
the origin) in analogy to fission rcactors, where the fuel matrix is often regarded as 
first barrier. 
Concerning the blanket safety, clearly only the aspects associated with the first bar-
rier (vacuum vessel or coolant boundary) and the fourth barrier (matrix of solid 
blanket materials) can be regardcd at present, whereas important safety aspects re-
lated to the second and third barriers (protecting personnel in normal operation and 
maintenance, managing internal accidents, mobilisation and transport of radioactiv-
ity in confinement rooms, leakage through confinement barriers, release to the envi-
ronment, hazards to the public) are out of the scope of this work. Also excluded 
are, by the terms of refcrence, all aspects associated with potential chemical re-
actions of blanket media with the first wall protection material. Thus, DEMO 
b}anket safety, in the frame of thc blanket concept selection exercise, was essentially 
restrictecl to assessing the following topics: 
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- type and amount of radioaclive invcntory in components of the blanket system 
including the cooling systems 
- encrgy sourccs which can trigger the dispersion of radioactive material 
- tolerance of the blankct system to abnormal conditions in terms of reaching de-
sign Iimits and releasing radionuclides 
- type and amount of radioactive waste. 
Thc above mentioned qualities had to be cast into a set of assessable safety issues, 
against which thc four DEMO blanket concepts could be evaluated on a compar-
ative basis. As a goal, they should be gcneric, decisive, and comprehensive to the 
largest extent possible. In an attempt to find the most appropriate way to define 
and structure the set of safety issucs, a scheme employed by Fiorini [7] was 
adopted in a modified form which is outlined in Appendix A. lt is based on the 
defence-in-depth strategy according to the International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group of the IAEA [8], reneiering a total of approximately 135 safety objectives 
which are listed in Table 10 on page 60. These objectives are structured at five 
Ievels of clefence, i.e., 
1. Prevention (by conservative design, quality assurance, safety culture) 
2. Contra! (of abnormal operation and detection of failures) 
3. Protection (by extra safety systems and protection systems) 
4. Accident management (by means of confinement protection) 
5. Conscquence mitigation (through off-site emergency response). 
In establishing the safety issues the Iist of objectives has been used as a checking 
Iist, asking \Vhich of the objectivcs constitutes a safety issue and should be treated 
in working group 6a. It was found that many of the objectives listed in Table 10 
(about 20) had to be assessed by other working groups, and that the majority of the 
remaining issues needs to be addressed in a later stage (those Iabelied "beyond 
BCSE"), as the plant dcsign advances, or is not specific to the blanket. For exam-
ple, most of the objectives listed in block 1.2 of Table 10 (minimise the frequency 
for abnormal situations) are related to initiators resulting from non-bianket compo-
nents, the behaviour of which is not known at present. Hence, a number of 23 is-
sues has been selected for treatment by the safety group. These 23 issues are listed 
in Tablc 4 on page 19 in the scquence of their appearance in the original Iist, and 
arc described in the next section. 
Piease note that in some cases an overlapping among safety issues, or a duplication 
with issucs from other working groups, could not be avoided. This has been ac-
counted for in the weighting faclor by engineering judgement. 
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4.2 Desct·iption of safety issues and weighting factors 
A description of the safety issucs from Table 4 on page 19 is given below, in addi-
tion to their rolc in the defcnce-in-depth strategy, and the rationale for assigning a 
weighting factor to measure thc issues relative importance in the context of the safe-
ty assessment. The weighting factor ranges in principle from 0 (no importance) to 
10 (extrcmcly important) as dcfined in Chapter 3 on page 5, step 3. Most of the 
issucs originate from the highcst Ievel of the defence-in-depth concept (prevention) 
deserving a high weighting factor. In a number of cases, howcver, the weighting fac-
tor was substantially rcduced due to the fact that the same concern was assumed to 
be addressed also by other working groups or because the Information was feit to be 
too immature as to yield a clear judgcment. Prominent examples for the first catego-
ry are issues No. 3, 9, 16, 18, 21, and 22 and, for the second group, the issues No. 
10, 11, 17. The following rationale applies to the 23 issues selcctcd for evaluation in 
working group 6a, safety: 
Issue 1: Minimise the fluids internal energy (system pressure) 
The stored energy is the driving source for mobilising radioactivity within the con-
finement, associatcd with work potential, giving rise to sevcre accident scenarios, in-
cluding confinemcnt darnage or bypass. Minimisation of the stored energy is, there-
fore, a principal design objective on the prevention Ievel (Ievel l) in regard to ex-
treme (hypothetical) accidents including those triggered by impacts generated ex-
ternal to the plant. Thus, the issue is judged extremely important with a weighting 
factor of 10. 
Issue 2: Minimise the amount of chemically reactive materials 
Fires can cause common modc failures jeopardising the plant control in case of 
leaks of combustiblc fluids, destroying cables, instrumentation equipment, isolation 
material, ctc. Potential fires call for cost effective protection provisions, especially if 
radioactive material is involved (rcquiring, for instance, the dispersion of inventories 
into small subsystcms, providing containment barriers with Iiners and cooling capa-
bilities, ventilation and filter systems, etc.). Of particular concern are radioactive 
fluids rendering violent chcmical reactions with water, air, and concrete in case of 
large LOCAs. Also solids can react violently or in a self-sustaining manner in ab-
normal situations. Avoidancc or minimisation of chemically reactive materials is, 
thcrcfore, a first level prevention type objective and is ranked extremely important 
(weighting factor of 10), even though the consequences can at prcsent only be quali-
tativcly asscssed. 
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Issue 3: Minimise the frequency of occurrence of LOCA due to extreme disruptions 
Plasma disruptions are phenomena which are not sufficiently understood as to be 
ruled out for a DEMO plant and, hence, their potential consequences will be classi-
fied as design basis accident (DBA). In the worst case a heavy disruption may Iead 
to (and is perhaps the major initiating event for) a multi-segment blanket darnage 
with subscquent !arge LOCA, implying all kinds of consequence analyses in the li-
censing process. Since the magnitude of forces and their impact location are highly 
uncertain, adequate mechanical dcsign in terms of strength (embrittlement) and ri-
gidity of blanket segment supports and pipe connections is hard to guaranty at the 
prcsent state of knowlcdge. This situation is expected to be improved at the time a 
DEMO plant will be built. In gcneral, the issue would nowadays be ranked as ex-
tremcly important. Howcver, this issue will also be addrcssed by WG 1 (dcsign) with 
view to capital investment. Furthermore, the consequences of LOCAs are treated 
in separate issues (e.g., No. 5 - 9). Therefore it is weighted by a factor of only 5, i.e., 
average importance. 
Issue 4: Minimise the mechanical energy release upon flushing of primary coolant 
In order to minimise the inhercnt potential consequences for the primary initiating 
evcnt (PIE), the mechanical encrgy rcleased in case of a pipc rupture should be kept 
small. This aids in simplifying the design of the blanket support structure, of the 
vacuum vessel, cryostat, expansion volumes, and of the second confinement barrier 
in terms of maximum Ioads and pressure. In principle, the mechanical cnergy re-
leased upon flushing can be kept low for single pipe ruptures by choosing small cir-
cuits. This, however, violates thc design and cost goal of elaborating a simplified 
heat removal systems architecture (point 1.5 in Table 10 on page 60). In general 
the issue is extremely important. Duc to the fact that the heat removal system ar-
chitectures for the DEMO blanket concepts are preliminary, and iess concept im-
manent, a weighting factor of 6 is considered adequate (also in conjunction with 
issue No. 23). 
lssue 5: Minimise the activation products in solid blanket materials 
The general safety objectives are to minimise the inherent potential consequences 
for a PIE (point 1.4 in Table 10 on page 60) and to minimise the radioactive waste 
(point 1. 7 in Table 1 0). Also afterheat production is one of the major safety con-
cerns. Substantial mobilisation of activation products from solids (ignoring here per 
definition the first wall protection material and related dust problems) can only oc-
cur in conjunction with severe accident scenarios, mainly in beyund design basis ac-
cidcnts (BDBAs). On the other hand, minimising the amount and Ievel of Iang-
term waste is another key requirement for fusion technology (sec issue No. 16). 
Overall, the issue is ranked as vcry important with a weighting factor of 8. 
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Remarie lt could havc been rankcd even high er, say 10, but given the ferritic steel, 
MANET, as structural material for all the four DEMO blanket concepts, differ-
cnces among concepts are small and the prospects for a low activation structural 
material for a DEMO are fair. 
lssue 6: Minimise the activation products in fluid blanket matelials 
Thc mobilisation of activation products (tritium will be treated separately in issue 
No. 8) from liquids, particularly in conjunction with chemical reactions and aerosol 
formation (DBAs and BDBAs) after a leak is easy. Afterheat in fluids needs to be 
considered, but will generally play a minor role, since activation Ievels are low com-
parcd to structural materials. Likewise, the waste problem with fluids can be allevi-
ated by implementing purification processes. Issues associated with personnet expo-
sure are treated scparately in issue No. 17. Overall, a weighting factor of 8 (very 
important) is applicd. 
lssue 7: Minimise the tritium inventory in solid blanket matelials 
Tritium build-up or implantation in the structural material (MANET) is moderate 
(see point 8 in Table 11 of Appendix B) and is not expected to pose a safety prob-
lem. The amount of tritium brcd in the solid breeder material is very !arge but is 
supposed to come out readily and to be carried away by the purge gas. Yet, a sub-
stantial fraction will reside in thc ccramics. An even !arger amount of tritium will 
remain in the beryllium multiplicr. U pon aceidentat temperature rises the tritium 
may be released, posing a potential hazard in case of severe blanket damage or rup-
turc of thc purge gas system. Thus, minimisation of the tritium inventory in solid 
blanket materials (and likewise in fluids, issue No. 8) reduces the inherent potential 
consequences for the PIE on thc prevention Ievel. The same weighting factor as for 
the fluids is applied, namely a factor of 6. 
Issue 8: Minimise the tritium inventory in fluid blanket matelials 
Tritium is easily mobilised upon flushing so that l 00 % release into the contain-
ment is postulated in most current safety assessments. Nevertheless, predictions of 
the biological hazards in case of aceidentat release to the cnvironment indicate mod-
erate impact as long as the amount of tritium released is of the order of 100 grams, 
which is the range of the total tritium inventory in the DEMO blanket fluids in-
volved, when on-line extraction is applied. A number of further issues related to 
tritium inventory in fluids result in the field of operational safety and in tritium 
extraction and fuel managemcnt systems which are treated separately (see issues 
No. 17, 18, 21) and by WG3, tritium. Hence, in the context of conscquences for a 
LOCA a weighting factor of 6 is chosen, that is, above average importance. 
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lssue 9: Minimise the consequences of events initiated by failure inside the steam gen-
erator 
Medium size or large leaks in steam generator tubes can Iead (depending on the 
parameters) to pressurisation of the circuits at the low pressure side, to material (in-
cluding activation products) transport, to chemical reactions, and, in the case of the 
dual coolant concept, to degradation of the thermal contact between the primary 
apd seconclary side. In the warst case these events can result in classical DBAs like 
(a) in-vessel LOCAs, (b) ex-vcssel LOCAs, (c) activation products release to the 
stcam systcm, and (d) activation products and tritium mobilisation within the con-
finement. Events of type (a), (b), and (d) will be addrcssed in issue No. 23 so that 
here only the activation products release to the steam system (type c) has to be con-
sidered, suggesting an average imporlancc Ievel with a weighting factor of 5. 
lssue 10: Design for natural convection of first wall primary coolant 
An effcctive thermal convcction capability llmits tcmperature transients and eases 
the proof of afterheat removal in the case of a single pump failure or loss of power 
events. The effectiveness of the natural convection depends on the type of coolant, 
the characteristics of the loop, heat transport mechanisms within the blanket to ad-
jacent (still cooled) regions, and on the elevation of the thermal centre of the heat 
sink (the steam gencrator) above that of the heat sourcc (the first wall). The latter is 
an open design parametcr. Thc Iack of detailed analyses for the DEMO blankets 
calls for a qualitative judgcmcnt on the issue at a moderate importance Ievel, 
weighting factor of 6, which has to be scen in conjunction with the issue No. 11. 
lssue 11: Design for natural conYection of the breeder /multiplier coolant 
The rationale as stated in issuc No. 10 for the first wall coolant applies, although 
the flow and heat characteristics arc different. The same weighting factor of 6 is 
assumed. 
Issue 12: Ensure adequate thermal inertia 
High thermal inertia of the blanket and related cooling systems Iimits temperature 
transients and amplitudes in upset or faulted conditions and, thereby, contributes 
inherently to minimise potential consequences for the PIE and eases plant control 
by making the blanket system more forgiving (point 2.2 in Table 1 0). The thermal 
inertia is mainly dictatcd by thc blanket concept (materials, masses) and cannot ea-
sily be altered by design oncc the concept is fixed. It can be expressed by, for in-
stance, the adiabatic temperature rise of the isolated blanket alone (driven by after-
heat) or by the temperature drift of the primary cooling systems in case of a com-
plete lass of heat sink. Typical values for the adiabatic heat-up are 150 oc to 
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300 oc in the first day. The issue is closely related to No. 22 and should, therefore, 
obtain a moderate weighting factor of 6. 
Issue 13: Reduce the potential for chemical reactions leading to hydrogen production 
apd heat generation 
Thc hydrogen issuc causes substantial R&D and protection effort in fission reactor 
technology (fuel claddingjsteam reactions in partially voided cores). Similar prob-
lems arise in tokamaks when, for example, hot first wall protection material reacts 
with stcam in accidcntal situations. Likewise, reactions of beryllium multiplier or 
liquid metal with water (steam) have to be considered in hypothetical accident sce-
narios, since water will most probably be used as coolant in other in-vessel compo-
nents. Prevention or reduction of hydrogen productions are, therefore, a high Ievel 
safety goal (points 1.4 and 4.2 in Table 1 0). Within BCSE the problern is alleviated 
by ignoring the first wall protection material according to the terms of reference val-
id for this exercise. However, in gcneral it is an unresolved key issue, also with re-
gard to implications on tests in ITER (WG 12, compatibility with ITER). The po-
tential for hydrogen production can, as a first approach, be assessed by filing the 
reactants inventory and evaluating their threshold temperatures for severe rcactions. 
The issue is qualified as very important (weighting factor of 8). 
Remark: During the safety issucs evaluation (Chapter 5) it became obvious that the 
issue was already covered in issue No. 2 (compare page 13 of Table 5). 
Issue 14: Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow reduction of the first wall pri-
mary coolant 
The first wall coolant flow is gcnerally a high velocity multi-channel parallel stream. 
Plugging can cause local or gross overheating of the first wall which can Iead to 
material degradation and eventually to LOCAs. Blockagcs of individual sub-
channcls cannot be detected. A gross and sudden blockage is unlikely to occur, but 
spurious and irregular blockagcs are conceivable, depending on the nature of the 
coolant flow (e.g., rcstrictions, velocities, coolant/channel wall chemistry, temper-
ature differences, mass transfcr). Minimising the potential for plugging is, thus, a 
first Ievel design and safety issue which ought to be classified as extremely impor-
tant. However, with view to the preliminary and qualitative nature of the evalu-
ation for the DEMO blanket concepts, the issue is ranked as vcry important with a 
weighting factor of 8. 
Issue 15: Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow reduction of the 
breeder fmultiplier primary coolant 
Thc breeder/multiplier coolant flow is a moderate velocity multi-channel parallel 
strcam. Plugging can causc local or gross overheating of structures and 
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breederjmultiplier material which can lead to temperature drifts outside the design 
windows (associated with swelling and tritium retention issues), to material degra-
dation, and eventually to structural damage. A gross and sudden flow blockage in a 
l~rge channel is unlikely to occur, but spurious and irregular blockages of individual 
small channels are conccivablc, depcnding on the nature of the coolant flow (e.g., 
restrictions, velocities, coolantjchanncl wall chemistry, temperature differences, de-
posits by mass transfer, phase changcs). Flow disturbances due to loss of insulation 
for liquid metal flows will be addresscd in WG 1 ( design). The related issues are pri-
marily design relevant with limited and only indirect impact on the plant safety. 
Thcreforc, the importance level is lower then the one of the equivalent issue for the 
first wall flow (issue No. 14), resulting in a wcighting factor of 5. 
Issue 16: Reduce the long-term waste 
Substantial amounts of radioactive material are produced in in-vesscl components, 
mainly in the blanket. Within thc blanket the highest specific activity (per unit mass 
or volume) will occur in the structural material which has a relatively short mission 
time (2-3 ycars) and the capability for recycling is only at the R&D stage. On the 
other hand, there is a good pcrspective to rcuse breeder and multiplier materials. 
fience, the structure will dominate the waste problern tagether with process waste 
evolving from recycling of reusable materials. Since (a) the structural material is the 
same for the four DEMO blanket concepts within BCSE, (b) the issues related to 
recycling of brccder/multiplier are subject to be covered in WG 9 (breeder) and 
WG 10, (berylllum), and (c) activation characteristics are also addressed in issues 
No. 5 and 6, a moderate importance with a weighting factor of 6 is assigned. 
Issue 17: Minimise the contact dose of heat transport systems 
The design objective is to minimise the personnel exposure at the prevention Ievel 
(point 1.8 in Table 1 0). Heat transport systems in ex-vessel compartments with 
complex pipework, valves, pumps, and heat exchangers are subject to recurring in-
spection, maintenance and rcpair and will give rise to substantial accumulated per-
sonne! doses in normal operation. At present only a qualitative assessment of per-
sonne! exposure can bc made regarding the gamma-dose rate of the heat transport 
fluids, the type of radioactive products carried by the fluids or being deposited 
somewhcre in the circuits, potential leakage, and tritium permeation through com-
partment and pipe walls. In prlnciplc the problern can be fought by design, control, 
and administrative means so that at the prescnt statc of knowledge (and with view 
to thc tight link with the issuc No. 18) a relatively Jow safety importance Ievel 
(weighting factor of 4) is foresccn. 
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Issue 18: Limit the length and complexity of circuits which carry activated fluids 
With view to the tremendous pipe length (the total pipe length of a primary cooling 
system approaches several kilometres, typically 5 km) the pipework bears a safety 
hazard not only in terms of pcrsonncl exposure (issue No. 17) but also in the sense 
of potcntially increasing thc frequency for abnormal situations (point 1.2 in 
Tablc 1 0). Besides the pipe lcngth also typical diameters, wall thickness, nurober of 
welds and joints, and the acccssibility for quality assurance and surveillance meas-
ures need to be considered. The issue obtains extra appreciation in design (WG4, 
loops) and reliability asscssment (WG6b) but the safety implications should be dis-
cusscd separately at a moderate importance Ievel, i.e., a weighting factor of 6. 
Issue 19: Extend weil established teclmologies 
Employing wcll cstablished tcchnologies is primarily a design issue to be covered in 
several WGs, viz. WGI(design), WG3 (tritium), WG4 (loops), WG7 (MHD), WG8 
(coatings), WOll (development risk). Safety is involved in as much as established 
technologies minimisc the unccrtainties in plant control (point 2.3 in Table 1 0) like, 
for instance, corrosion product transport, tritium control, impact of MHD effects, 
reliability of valves and pumps, reliability of sensors, durability of coatings, material 
fatigue, etc. The issue can only be assessed qualitatively but its importance in safe-
ty is ranked high applying a wcighting factor of 8. 
Issue 20: Provide for redundancy of cooling systems 
The aim is to minimise the uncertaintics in controlling abnormal operation by re-
dundant andjor diverse cooling systems (point 2.3 in Table 10). Diverse cooling 
systcms supplying the samc blankct segment help inherently in short term afterheat 
removal in case of LOCAs or LOFAs at moderate tcmperature transients. They, 
thereby, simplify the incidental seenarios to be designed for in the safety systems 
and protcction systems Iayout (point 3.4 in Table 1 0). The importance Ievel of the 
issue is ranked very high, i.e., with a weighting factor of 8. 
Issue 21: Minimise the tritium permeation to steam systems 
The aim is to minimise the radioactive relcase during normal operation (point 5.2 in 
Table 10). Tritium permeating to the steam system is considered to be released to 
the environment, for which an u pper Iimit of 10 to 20 Ci pcr day is presently as-
sumcd to be acceptable for normal operation. The permeation rate through steam 
gencrator tubes depends on temperatures, tritium partial pressure in the primary 
coolant, coatings, tube material and surface area. Small leakages have to be taken 
into account if the primary prcssure is higher than the pressure on the steam siele 
(comparc issue No. 9). Those parameters are specific to the blanket concepts and 
will be evaluated in a consistent way by WG3 (tritium). Yet, large uncertainties will 
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remain and the safety implications have to be addressed separately at an average 
importance level. A weighting factor of 5 will be applied. 
Issue 22: Minimise the release of activation products in case of loss of heat sink 
Completc loss of heat sink is an event in the BDBA domain in which heat removal 
via the blanket cooling systems (at least for part of the torus) is lost for a prolonged 
period of time. The amount of decay heat and the thermal inertia of the blanket are 
the driving parameters for temperature rises which are influenced by the blanket 
concept. The effectiveness of the emergency heat removal means (radiation to the 
VV or cryostat, conduction to thc intact blanket segments (if any), cooling of VV or 
cryostat walls) is then a matter of plant design beyond BCSE. Favourable features 
of thc blanket, like low decay heat, high thermal inertia (issue No. 12) and ]arge 
margin before structure melting alleviate the design and licensing. The issue is con~ 
sidered to be important. However, with view to the separate treatment of the issue 
12, which is based on similar arguments, a weighting factor of 4 (below average im-
portancc) is assigned. 
Issue 23: Minimise the release of activation products in case of DBAs 
The issue includes a number of safety objectives on the severe accident management 
level and the consequcnces mitigation level, (points 4 and 5, respectively, of the de-
fence-in-depth strategy, Table I 0). The ultimate release of activation products to 
thc environment involves a serics of mechanisms starting from the accident scenario 
via dispersion of radioactive material within the affected compartment, mobilisation 
in form of gaseous effluents or acrosols, transport and perhaps plate-out in com-
partments, Ventilation and filter efficiency, leakage through confinement barriers, 
release to and dispersion in the cnvironment under varying weather conditions, and 
finally thc biological implications to the public. This sequence can only be assessed 
in a simplified and enveloping way by (a) defining the worst case accident scenario, 
(b) estimating the radioactive inventory, (c) estimating the amount that can escape 
in the worst DBA, (d) estimating a mobilisation fraction (nuclide by nuclide), (e) 
assuming a confinement retention factor, and (f) assessing the radiological conver-
sion factors (again nuclide by nuclide). Within the BCSE steps (a), (b), and (c) can 
be addrcssed at most in terms of total activity (in Becquerels) escaping into the af-
fected compartment. Neverthelcss, the importance is ranked very high giving a 
weighting factor of 8. 
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Table 4. Safety issues and weighting factors 
Issue Weighting Principal 
Factor I nvestigator 
PREVENTION 
1. Minimise the fluids internal cnergy (system pressure) 10 Kleefeldt 
2. Minimise the amount of chcmically reactive material 10 Marbach 
3. Minimise the frequency of occurrcnce of LOCA due 5 Kleefeldt 
to extreme disruptions 
4. Minimise the mechanical encrgy rclcase upon flush- 6 Kleefeldt 
ing of primary coolant 
5. Minimise the activation products in solid blanket ma- 8 Porftri 
terials 
6. Minimise the activation products in fluid blanket ma- 8 Porfiri 
terials 
7. Minimise the tritium inventory in solid blankct mate- 6 Porfiri 
rials 
8. Minimise the tritium inventory in fluid blanket mate- 6 Porfiri 
rials 
9. Minimise the consequences of events initiated by fail- 5 Marbach 
urc insidc the steam gencrators 
10. Design for natural convection of first wall primary 6 Marbach 
coolant 
11. Design for natural convection of brcedcr/multiplier 6 Marbach 
primary coolant 
12. Ensure adequate thermal incrtia 6 Kleefeldt 
13. Reduce the potential for chemical rcactions leading 8 Porfiri 
to hydrogen production and hcat generation 
14. Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow re- 8 Kleefeldt 
duction of thc first wall primary coolant flow 
15. Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow re- 5 Kleefeldt 
duction of the breeder/multiplier coolant flow 
16. Reduce the long term waste 6 Porfiri 
17. Minimise the contact dose of heat transport systems 4 K1eefeldt 
18. Limit the length and complcxity of circuits which car- 6 Porfiri 
ry activated fluids 
CONTROL 
19. Extend weil established technology 8 Kleefeldt 
20. Provide for redundancy of cooling systems 8 Marbach 
MITIGATION 
21. Minimise the tritium permeation to steam systems 5 Marbach 
22. Minimise the release of activation products in case of 4 Marbach 
lass of heat sink 
23. Minimise the release of activation products in case of 8 Kleefeldt 
dcsign basis accidents (DBA) 
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5. Safety Issues Evaluation 
The safety issues evaluation, that is the rating of each blanket concept against each 
of the issues according to step 5 in Chapter 3, is the most difficult part of the exer-
c~se, since many of thc issues can only be assessed qualitatively, leaving room for 
subjective influences. A two stcp procedure was adopted in working group 6a: 
1. Draft evaluation of one third of the issues by each of the three WG6a members 
(principal investigator as indicated in in Table 4 on page 19). 
2. Discussion, refinement, ancl agrcement on the draft evaluation within WG6a for 
submission to the Blanket Co-ordination Group. 
After cliscussion of the safety issues evaluation at a workshop [9] involving all 
working groups, a few moclifications to 6 of the 23 issues evaluations became neces-
sary, leacling to the rating presented in this report. 
In general the basis for the evaluationwas 
- the projects summary reports prepared for each concept [1 ], [2], [3], [ 4] 
- thc data compiled by WG6a in the data sheets (Appendix B on page 65) 
- information requested by WG6a from experts on demand. 
In order to make the results as transparent as possible, half of the issues could be 
broken down to several sub-issues (typically 3 to 5). These sub-issues were then rat-
ed individually and the mcan of Lhe sub-issues ratings was taken as the rating for 
the whole issue. This implics that the sub-issues had to be defined as to have an 
equal weight among the set of sub-issues. 
The rationale for the sub-issucs and issues ratings is summarised in Table 5 on 
page 22 (one page per issue). The tables give a briefand general description of the 
concerns and then list for the four blanket concepts the relevant background infor-
mation (sccond column), the issucs (or sub-issues) evaluation and the sub-issues rat-
ings on a scale from -2 to 0 (third column),' and finally the issues ratings (fourth 
column). 
For abbreviations, please refer to Chapter 9 on page 57. 
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Tablc 5 (Page l of 23). Issues cvaluation and rating 
Issuc No. 1: Minimise the fluids internal energy (system pressure) 
lssue description: The stored energy in cornprcssible fluids is the driving source for mobilising radioactivity within the 
conllncment, associated with work potential giving rise to severe accident scenarios. Minimisation of the stored energy is, 
therefore, a basic design objective on the prcvention Ievel and is mainly directed towards beyond design basis accident 
seenarios initiated from outside the plant. (Thc more conceivable dcsign basis accidents with failure of a single subsystem 
and their consequences are covered elscwhere, for instance in issues No. 4 and 23). The issue considered here is the isen-
tropic work potential of the compressed Ouids inventory when released into the atmosphere. (The chemical energy po-
tential is discussed in issue No. 2) 
ßlan-
ket 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
llackground 
The total helium inventory for thc PW 
cooling circuits and the 
breederfmultiplier cooling circuits has 
not been evaluated. lt is assumcd that 
IJIT has, despite the lower system pres-
sure but because of the !arge steam 
generators, the same helium invcntory 
as BOT, i.e., 20,000 kg (10300 PW and 
9700 BZ). lt is further assumed that 25 
% of the thermal power be removed by 
the FW cooling system at 6,5 Ml'a and 
a mean temperature of 312•c, and 75 
% are carried by the breeding zonc 
system at 5 MPa, 375 •c. 
The total helium inventory for FW and 
breederfmultiplier cooling is approxi-
mately 20,000 kg (see data sheets) at a 
pressure of 8 MPa and an average 
temperature of 3 so·c, corresponding 
to 3300 m3. 
The total helium invcntory for FW 
cooling is approximately 6400 kg (see 
data sheets) at a pressure of 8 M l'a 
and an average temperature of 300°C, 
corresponding to 950 ml. 
The total water inventory in the two 
FW cooling circuits and the 4 brceding 
zone cooling circuits is given in the 
data sheets to be 142,000 kg (33 ,000 kg 
per FW cooling circuit and 19,000 kg 
per breeding zone cooling circuit).The 
use of water condensation in affectcd 
rooms other than the vacuum vesscl is 
an efficient means to mitigate pressuri-
sation. 
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Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) The isentropic work potential of the total helium 
inventory is 30.6 GJ. Large expansion volumes 
are required; considerable problems. (-2.0) 
(i) The isentropic work potential of the total helium 
inventory is 32.1 GJ. Large expansion volumcs 
are required; considerable problems. ( -2.0) 
(i) The isentropic work potential of the total helium 
inventory is 9.4 GJ; somc problems. (-1.0) 
(i) The enthalpy change of the water inventory is 
29.8 GJ for an isentropic expansion to 0.1 MPa, 
steam quality of 34 %. (179 GJ for full conden-
sation); some prob1ems. ( -1.0) 
Rat-
ing 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
Table 5 (Page 2 of 23). lssucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 2: Minimise thc amount of chemically reactive material 
Sub-Issues description: Chemically reactive rnaterials are included in all four blanket concepts in !arge quantities, i.e., 
Pb-17Li in the DC and WC concepts, NaK in the tritiurn removal circuit of the DC concept, and solid beryllium in the 
BIT (as sintered pellets) and in the BOT (as small pebbles) concept. Hence, the following potential hazards are consid-
ered qualitatively as sub-issues: (i) Pb-17Lifwater reaction, (ii) Pb-17Lifoxygen reaction, (iii) NaKfwater reaction, (iv) 
NaKfoxygcn reaction, (v) berylliumfwater reaction, and (vi) berylliumfoxygen reaction. 
Blan-
kct 
lliT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
The total beryllium in-
ventory is about 530 
tons, peak operating 
temperature is 450'C, 
sintered pellets, 80 % 
dense, 40 micrometer 
grain size results in a 
!arge surface (theore" 
tically !arger than in 
BOT) but the amount 
of open porosity is not 
known. 
The total beryllium in-
ventory is about 300 
tons, the peak operat-
ing temperature de-
clines from 640'C at 
BOL to 500'C at EOL, 
molten pebbles of typi-
cally 2 and 0.13 mm 
size, almost I 00 % 
dense, easy to mobilise 
if not baked together. 
The total Pb-17Li in-
ventory is 15 x 106 kg 
at 425'C outlet temper-
ature. The total NaK 
inventory is about 
41 ,000 kg at maximum 
temperature of ca. 350 
'C, divided into 10 sep-
arate loops. 
The total Pb-17 Li in-
ventory is about 
8 x 106 kg at peak tem-
peratures close to 500 
'C (4 loops). The total 
water coolant inventory 
is 142,000 kg at an out-
let temperature of 325 
'C (6 loops). 
Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) not applicable 
(ii) not applicable 
(iii) not applicable 
(iv) not applicable 
(v) in the case of a break in the steam generator steam and water 
can enter the helium circuit and Iead to berylliumfwater reactions 
with hydrogen production. There are two barriers, one in the 
blanket (a 0.5 mm cladding in the inner module rows) and an-
other one in thc SG. 
(vi) air ingress into the helium circuit can Iead to berylliumfair re-
action. i\gain, two barriers would have to fail. 
Sub-issues rating: (v) and (vi) are much more hypothetical than (i) to 
(iv) for DC and WC, therefore BIT and BOT must have a better rat-
ing than DC and WC, i.e., (-0.2). 
(i) not applicable 
(ii) not applicable 
(iii) not applicable 
(iv) not applicable 
(v) in the case of a break in the steam generator steam and water 
can enter the helium circuit and Iead to berylliumfwater reactions 
with hydrogen production (despite the fact that in normal opera-
tion primary pressure higher than secondary pressure). There are 
two high pressure barriers, one in the blanket and another one in 
the SG. 
(vi) air ingress into helium circuit can Iead to berylliumfair reaction, 
risk of Iire. i\gain, two barriers would have to fail. 
Sub-issues rating: similar rating as BIT, much smaller beryllium in-
ventory, probably smaller surface, and two high pressure barriers are 
assumcd to almost compensate for higher mobility and somewhat 
higher operating temperature (-0.4). 
(i) limited Pb-17Lifwater reaction possible in SG; double wall tube 
barrier, however see (iii). 
(ii) Pb-17Lifoxygen reaction possible in rooms containing pipes and 
SG; one barrier; very limited reaction. 
(iii) potential NaKfwater reaction in SG very violent; limited by 
amount of NaK, but protection and mitigation systcm have to 
be implemented. 
(iv) Risk of NaK Iire in SG rooms, protection and mitigation needed. 
(v) not applicable 
(vi) not applicable 
Sub-issues rating: no in-vessel reactions of type (i) to (iv); concerns are 
mainly for ex-vessel events, some problems (-1.0). 
(i) problern to manage the Pb-17 Lifwater reaction in case of LOCA 
inside the blanket despite the brazed double wall tubes; pressuri-
salion of blanket box; protection and mitigation needed. 
(ii) l'b-17Li(oxygen reaction possible in rooms containing pipes and 
SG; one barrier only, but very limited reaction. 
(iii) not applicable 
(iv) not applicable 
(v) not applicable 
(vi) not applicable 
Sub-issues rating: considerable in-vessel problems with sub-issue (i) 
Rat-
ing 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-1.0 
-2.0 
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'fable 5 (Page 3 of 23). Issues evaluation and rating 
Issuc No. 3: Minimise the freguency of occurrence of LOCA due to extreme disruptions 
Sub-Issucs description: I Ieavy disruptions can apply extreme Ioads to the blanket segments and ,thus, can endanger the 
integrity of the blankct structure. Since both thc type and magnitude of Ioads and their impact location as weil as the 
possible response of the blanket segments are unknown, only a relative and qualitative judgement can be made on the 
vulnerability of the different blanket concepts to different lypes of Ioads despite thc promising effort spenl in developing 
models and analysing these effecls. Hence, the sub-issues are expressed in terms of the vulnerability of the blankel seg-
ments against the following types of Ioads: (i) elcctromagnelic global forces (mainly twisting and bending), (ii) gross dis-
tributed Ioads lo the first wall (resulting in extra bending and buckling stresses), (iii) local distributed Ioads lo the first 
wall, (iv) bending Ioads to supporls and pipc connections, (v) thermal Ioads generated by local plasma impact, runaway 
electrons, or arcing. (Sub- issues iii and v apply only, if no extra firsl wall protection is considered as is done here.) 
BI an-
kct 
ß!T 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
( a) The segment box consists of a thin-
walled structure with embedded circular 
coolant channels. (b) The plasma side 
is corrugated with a single 3 mm chan-
nel wall. (c) There are apparently no 
stiffening ribs ( other than small local-
ised fins), (d) The total number of coo-
lant feeders per segment is 8. 
(a) The segment box consists of a du-
plex sheel, diffusion welded with inte-
gral reetangular (machined) cooling 
channels, 25 mm overall thickness. (b) 
Al the rear side there are numerous to-
roidal-radial cooling plates atlachcd by 
welding which act as stiffcners in the 
entire breeding region. (c) The total 
number of coolant feeders is 4. 
(a) The segment box consists of a du-
plex sheet, diffusion welded with inte-
gral reetangular (machined) cooling 
channels. (b) Several internal, relatively 
thick, plates in both directions of the 
cross section make the box extremely 
stiff. (c) The wall is comparably thick 
(38 mm). (d) The totalnumber of coo-
lant feeders per segment is 6, 2 l'b-17Li 
pipes being very heavy. 
(a) The segmentbox consists of a thin-
walled (13 mm) structure with embed-
ded soft-brazed circular coolant tubes. 
(b) The plasma side is corrugated with 
wall thickness of 3-4 mm. (c) Thcre 
are several internal plates in both di-
rections of the cross section making thc 
blanket box very stiff. (d) The number 
of coolant fceders per OB segment is 6 
(central segments) and 8 (lateral scg-
ments) with double and triple walls. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
some problems with Ioad type (i) due to (a) and 
(c) 
considerable problems with Ioad type (ii) due to 
(a), (b), and (c ) 
considerable problems with Ioad type (iii) due to 
(a), (b), and (c) 
some problems with Ioad type (iv) at 
modulefmanifold joints from forces exerted to 
modules. 
some problems with Ioad type (v) due to (a) and 
(b). 
no relevant problems with Ioad type (i) due to 
(b) 
some problems with Ioad type (ii) (with regard to 
bending) due to (b) 
no problems with Ioad type (iii) due to (b) 
minor problems with Ioad type (iv) 
no problems with Ioad type (v) due to (a). 
(i) no relevant problems with Ioad type (i) due lo 
(b) and (c) 
(ii) no problems with Ioad type (ii) due lo (a), (b), 
and (c) 
(iii) no problems with load type (Hi) due tu (a), (b), 
and (c) 
(iv) some problems with Ioad type (iv) due to (d) 
(v) no problems with Ioad type (v) due to (a) and 
(c). 
(i) no relevant problems with Ioad type (i) due to (c) 
(ii) no problems with Ioad type (ii) due to (c) 
(iii) no problems with Ioad type (iii) due to (a) and 
(c) 
(iv) some problems with Ioad type (iv) particularly at 
divertor segments. 
(v) some problems with Ioad type (v) due to (a) and 
(b). 
Rat-
ing 
-0.7 
-0.15 
-0.1 
-0.2 
Note: No consensus could be achieved bctween ENEA and FZK on the sub-issues ratings and on the issues ratings. 
Therefore, the issues ratings given in the right column represent mean values of votings frorn T. Porfiri: 0/0/0/0 and K. 
Kleefeldt: -1.4/- 0.3/-0.2/-0.4, which were afterwards also accepted by G. M arbach. 
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Tablc 5 (Page 4 of 23). lssucs evaluation and rating 
Issue No. 4: Minimise the mechanical energy release upon nushing of primary coolant 
Sub-Jssucs description: Although the probability for a pipe rupture of the primary cooling system (PCS) resulting in high 
mornentum forces and subsequent darnage propagation (involvernent of other loop cornponents or darnage of conline-
rnent barricrs) is very low, such events are considered as design basis accidents. The extrernely unlikely case of a double-
ended pipe rupture is postulated here as a reference case to occur eilher in-vessel or ex-vessel. The resulting sub-issues 
are: (i) pressurisation of the vacuurn vcssel (assuming 5000 m 3 free volurne) in cornbination with required expansion 
volurnes (assuming 0.2 MI'a absolute end pressure), (ii) momenturn forces and potential consequences for in-vessel LO-
Ct\s ( feeder break), (iii) pressurisation of containment compartrnents for ex-vessel LOCAs, (iv) mornenturn forces and 
potential consequences for ex-vessel LOCt\s (hol leg rupture). 
Blan-
ke! 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
The PCS cornprises 4 independcnt 
cooling circuits (CC), 2 for the seg-
rnent boxes and two for the breed-
ing zone. The largest CC has a he-
liurn inventory of 5?.00 kg and a 
work potential of 8.3 GJ. Pipe di-
arneters are 2.2 m for the hot leg 
and 0.28 m for the feeders. 
The PCS cornprises 18 CC, 2x3 for 
the inboard and 2x6 for the out-
board. The largest independent 
cooling sub-system comprises 6 cir-
cuits for the outboard with a heli-
um inventory of ca. 7000 kg and a 
work potential of II GJ. Pipe di-
arneters are 1.1 rn for the hot leg 
and 0.3 m for the feeders. 
The PCS comprises 10 helium CCs 
for the FW and 10 Pb-17Li CCs 
for the breeding zone. The cooling 
sub-system with the largest work 
potential comprises 3 helium CCs 
for the FW with an inventory of 
ca. 2000 kg and a work potential 
of aboul 3 GJ. Pipe diameters are 
0.76 m for the hotleg and 0.15 m 
for the feeders. 
The PCS comprises 6 waler CCs, 
viz. 2 for the FW and 4 for lhe 
breeding zone. The largest cooling 
subsystem comprises I circuit serv-
ing 24 OB and 16 IB segment box-
es. ll contains 33,000 kg of pres-
surised water with an enthalpy of 
47 GJ. Pipediametersare 0.54 m 
(hot leg) and 0.1 m (feeders). 
Suh-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) Pressurisation of VV would be I. 17 MI'a without ex-
pansion volume, required extra expansion volurne 
56,000 m3; substantial problerns (-1.5) 
(ii) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended feeder 
break 160 kN per side; sorne problems (-1.0) 
(iii) Pressurisation of containment (20,000 m3 free vol-
ume ftlled with air) 0.4 M Pa; substantial problems 
(-!.5) 
(iv) M omenturn forces in case of a double-ended hot leg 
break 8300 kN per side; considerable problems (-2.0) 
Subtotal: -6.0 
(i) Pressurisation of VV would be 1.5 MPa without ex-
pansion volurne, requiring 70,000 m3 extra expansion 
volurne; considerable problems (-2.0) 
(ii) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended feeder 
break would be ca. 250 kN per side; substantial 
problerns (-1.5) 
(iii) Pressurisation of containment (20,000 m 3 free vol-
ume ftlled with air) 0.49 M Pa; considerable problems 
(-2.0) 
(iv) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended hotleg 
break 4220 kN per side; some problems ( -1.0) 
Subtotal: -6.5 
(i) Pressurisation of VV approx. 0.45 MPa, required ex-
pansion volume 14,000 m3; minor problems (-0.5) 
(ii) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended feeder 
break 54 kN per side; minor problems (-0.5) 
(iii) Pressurisation of containment (20,000 m3 free vol-
urne nlled with air) 0.2 MPa; minor problems (-0.5) 
(iv) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended hotleg 
break 2000 kN per side; minor problems (-0.5) 
Subtolal: -2.0 
(i) Pressurisation of VV would be 0.38 MPa with a 
steam content of 28 %. This can be enhanced by aft-
erheat. Required expansion volume without conden-
sation 10,000 m 3; minor problems (-0.5) 
(ii) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended feeder 
break 21 kN per side; some problems due to triple-
wall tubes. (-1.0) 
(iii) Pressurisation of containment (20,000 m 3 free vol-
ume lilled with air) 0.19 M Pa, condensation possible; 
minor problems (-0.5) 
(iv) Momentum forces in case of a double-ended hot leg 
break 560 kN per side; minor problems (-0.5) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
Rat-
ing 
-1.5 
-1.6 
-0.5 
-0.6 
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Table 5 (Page 5 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 5: Minimise the activation products in solid blanket materials 
Sub-Issues description: 1t is distinguished between activation products in the structural material, breeder, and multiplier. 
Due lo the Iack of detailed data on the spatial activation product distribution (e.g., in the first wall, breeding zone, and 
shieldjrnanifold region) only typical numbers are considered here as a preliminary evaluation in sub-issues (i) structural 
material, (ii) solid breeder, and (iii) solid multiplier, i.e., beryllium. (All values refer to the time = 0 (after 20,000 h of 
operation) 
ßlan-
ket Background Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
ßiT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
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(i) no detailed data are reported for BIT, however, 
it is assumed that the problern with MANET is 
similar for all concepts, particularly in the first 
wall region·, some problem. (-1.0) 
(ii) specific activity in the breeder (outboard) is 
4.48El3 Bqjkg, beingratedas minor problern 
(-0.5) 
(iii) specific activity in multiplicr ( outboard) is 
2.98EI4 Bqjkg; rated as substantial problern be-
cause of the !arge berylliurn inventory (-1.5) 
Subtotal: -3.0 
(i) specific activity in FW jbreeding zonejshield is re-
ported as 6.4El4jl.6EI3jl.2El3 Bqjkg, and the 
total activity in the corresponding regions is 
4.8EI9j6.3El9/2.8El9 Bq; some problems (-1.0) 
(ii) specific activity in the breeder ( outboard) is 
9.2E13 Bqjkg, beingratedas minor problern 
(-0.5) 
(iii) specific activity in multiplier (outboard) is 2.1 E14 
Bqfkg; rated as substantial problern because of 
the !arge beryllium inventory. (-1.5) 
Subtotal: -3.0 
(i) the total activity in FWjbreedingjmanifold is 
5.2El9j9.0EI9/4.4El8 Bq; same order of magni-
tude as BOT; some problern (-1.0) 
(ii) no solid breeder, not appiicable. ( + 0.0) 
(iii) no solid multiplier, not applicable. ( + 0.0) 
Subtotal: -1.0 
(i) no detailed data are reported for WC, however, 
it is assumed that the problern with MANET is 
similar for all concepts, particularly in the first 
wall region; some problem. (-1.0) 
(ii) no solid brecder, not applicable. ( + 0.0) 
(iii) no solid multiplier, not applicable. ( + 0.0) 
Subtotal: -1.0 
Rat-
ing 
-\.0 
-1.0 
-0.3 
-0.3 
Tablc 5 (Page 6 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 6: Minimise the activation products in fluid blanket materials 
Sub-Issucs description: lt is distinguished between activation products in the liquidbreedermaterial Pb-17Li, coolant, and 
purge gas. Due to the Iack of detailed data on the spatial activation products distribution only typical numbers are con-
sidered hcre as a preliminary evaluation of sub-issues (i) Pb- I 7Li for DC and WC, (ii) coolant, i.e., hclium for BIT, BOT, 
and DC (firsl wall only), and water in WC concept, and (iii) purge gas for BIT and BOT. (i\11 values refer to the time = 
0 afler 20,000 h of operation) 
ßlan-
kct 
DIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) no liquid brceder, not applicable. (0.0) 
(ii) activation products in helium are small; pro-
visions must be Laken for on-line removal of 
sputter products from the main stream; minor 
problems. (-0.5) 
(iii) activalion products in purge gas (helium) is 
small; removal will occur in the tritium ex-
traction system; minor problems. (-0.5) 
Subtolal: -1.0 
(i) no liquid breeder, not applicable. (0.0) 
(ii) activation products in helium are small; pro-
visions must be taken for on-line removal of 
sputter products from the main stream; minor 
problems. (-0.5) 
(iii) activation products in purge gas (helium) are 
small; removal will occur in the tritium ex-
traction system; minor problems (-0.5) 
Subtotal: -1.0 
(i) the total activity in the liquid breeder is 6E20 
Bq (front channel row), ignoring any dilution 
due to circulation in the loops; streng decay after 
a few seconds and after one day, but long-lived 
isotopes like Po-21 0 and Hg- 203 encounter con-
siderable problems. (-2.0) 
(ii) activation products in helium cooiant for the first 
wall are small; provisions must be Laken lo an-
Jine removal of sputter products from the main 
stream; minor problems (-0.5) 
(iii) no purge gas, not applicable. (0.0) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
(i) no detailed data are reported for WC, however it 
is assumed that the problem with Pb-17Li is si-
milar to that in the DC concept. The speciflc ac-
tivity is expected to be higher than in DC be-
cause of the small dilution effect, considerable 
problems. (-2.0) 
(ii) no data available for the water coolant, effective 
purification has to be employed, which is rated 
similar as the helium purification in the DC con-
cepl. The N-16 activation is addressed in lssue 
No. 17, minor problems. (-0.5) 
(iii) no purge gas, not applicable. (0.0) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
Rat-
ing 
-0.3 
-0.3 
-0.8 
-0.8 
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Table 5 (Page 7 of 23). Issues evaluation and rating 
lssue No. 7: Minimise the tritium inventory in solid blanket materials 
Sub-Issues description: ll is distinguished between the tritium inventory in (i) structural material, (ii) solid breeder 
(LhZr03 or UAI02 for BIT and U4Si04 for the BOT concepl), and (iii) beryllium as multiplier (as pellets for BIT and 
pebbies for BOT). 
Blan-
kct 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) The reported total inventory for the structure is 3 5 g. Large uncertain-
lies cxisl in lhe assessment due to the unknown effect of tritium implan-
tation in the first wall from the plasma. As an upper bound 300 g are 
currently assumed. Because of the low mobiiisation the problern is rated 
as minor. (-0.5) 
(ii) The reported total inventory in the breeder is I 00 g in case of UAI02 
and would be much less for U2Zr03. ln general this is not considered as 
a safety problern (0.0) 
(iii) The total invcntory in beryllium is in the range of 400 g - 3400 g (BIT 
report [I]). There is agreement that the tritium inventory will be I arger 
lhan in BOT because of the much !arger beryllium inventory and the 
lower operating temperature (see Issue No. 2).The releaserate upon a 
temperature rise will be smaller than in BOT (lowcr temperature). Nev-
ertheiess, the !arge inventory is rated as considerable safety problem. 
(-2.0) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
(i) The reported total inventory for the structure is 30 g. Large uncertain-
ties exist in the assessment due to the unknown effect of tritium implan-
tation in the first wall from the plasma. As an upper bound 300 g are 
currently assumcd. Because of the low mobiiisation the problern is rated 
as minor. ( -0.5) 
(ii) The rcported total inventory in the breeder is 10 g for L14Si04. In gener-
al this is not considered as a safety problem. (0.0) 
(iii) The reported total tritium inventory in beryllium is 1280 g. The tritium 
release from beryllium pebbles upon a temperature rise will be slow (se-
veral % immediately and less than 0.1 % per hour afterwards). The 
same rating is applied as for BIT. The higher relative release rate in 
BOT in case of a temperature transient is expected to be compensated 
by the much smaller tritium inventory. (-2.0) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
(i) The reported total inventory for the structure is 19 g. Large uncertain-
ties exist in the assessment due to the unknown effect of tritium implan-
tation in the first wall from the plasma. As an upper bound 300 g are 
currently assumed. Because of the low mobilisation the problern is rated 
as minor. (-0.5) 
(ii) not applicable (0.0) 
(iii) not applicable (0.0) 
Subtotal: -0.5 
(i) The reported total inventory for the structure is 13 g. Large uncertain-
ties exist in the assessment due to the unknown effect of tritium implan-
tation in the first wall from the plasma. As an upper bound 300 g are 
currently assumed. Because of the low mobilisation the problern is rated 
as minor. (-0.5) 
(ii) not applicable (0.0) 
(iii) not applicable (0.0) 
Subtotal: -0.5 
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Rat-
ing 
-0.8 
-0.8 
-0.2 
-0.2 
Tablc 5 (Page 8 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Jssue No. 8: Minimise the tritium inventory in Ouid materials 
Sub-lssues description: It is distinguished bctween the tritium inventory in (i) Pb-17Li for DC and WC, (ii) coolant, i.e., 
helium for IJIT, ßOT, and DC (ftrst wall only), and water in the WC concept, and (iii) purge gas for ßlT and BOT. 
Blan-
ke! 
BIT 
ßOT 
DC 
wc 
Background Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) no liquid breeder, not applicable 
(ii) The total tritium inventory in the he!ium coo-
lant is reported to be 5 g. Tritium permeation 
into the coolanl is uncertain but should not sig-
niftcantly innuence the equilibrium content, if 
on-line extraction is provided. 
(iii) The total lritium invenlory in the purge gas is 
reported to be 0.06 g. 
The total tritium inventory is about 5 g. This is rated 
as a minor problem. Sub-issucs rating (i) to (iii): (-0.5) 
(i) no liquid breeder, not applicable 
(ii) The total tritium inventory in the helium coo-
lant is reported to be 0.5 g. 
(iii) The total tritium in ventory in the purge gas is 
reported to be 0.16 g. 
The total tritium inventory is less than I g. This is rat-
ed as a minor problem. Sub-issues rating (i) to (iii): 
(-0.5) 
(i) The totaltritium inventory in the Pb-17Li is re-
ported to be 60 g. 
(ii) The total tritium inventory in the helium coo-
lant is assumed to be 0.3 g (scaled down from 
ßOT). 
(iii) no purge gas, not applicable. 
The total tritium inventory is about 60 g. This can 
cause some safety problem. Sub-issues rating (i) to 
(iii): ( -1.0) 
(i) The total tritium inventory in the Pb-l7Li is re-
ported lo be 50 g. 
(ii) The total tritium inventory in the water coolant 
is reported to be 5 g at a tritium concentration 
of 0.5 Cijkg of water (corresponding to 100m3 
of water inventory which is perhaps too low). 
Realisation of this low concentration needs to 
be proved. 
(iii) no purge gas, not applicable. 
The total tritium inventory is about 55 g. This can 
cause some safety problem. Sub-issues rating (i) to 
(iii): (-1.0) 
Rat-
ing 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-1.0 
-1.0 
5. Sarety Issues Evaluation 29 
Tablc 5 (Page 9 of 23). Issm'B cvaluafion and rating 
Issue No. 9: Minimise the consequences of events iniliated by failure inside the steam generators 
Issue description: A possible breach inside the steam generalor, on lhe secondary cooling circuit or between the primary 
and secondary cooling circuits might Iead lo pressurisation of the second confinement barrier, to the release of activation 
products, to chemical reactions, and to the loss of heat sink. In any case, the expansion of the cooling Ouid, spread from 
the breach, and the dispersion of activated products may be managed through specific expansion volumes or appropriate 
rcducing devices. (This is also treated in Issue No. 4.) 
BI an-
ket 
ß!T 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
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Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
!ssue evaluation: Since the tritium inventory in the 
helium is moderate (a few grams per circuit, see Jssue 
No. 8) and the primary pressure is lower then the sec-
ondary pressure, leakage of helium inlo the sleam cir-
cuit is not a safety problem. (The potential for chemi-
cal reactions in the case of water ingress into the heli-
um circuit is addressed in Jssue No. 2.) 
I ssue rating: (0.0) 
I ssue evaluation: Since the tritium inventory in the 
helium is extremely low (a few tenths of grams per cir-
cuit, see lssue No. 8) leakage of helium into the steam 
circuit is not a safety problem. 
Issue rating: (0.0) 
A major concern is the chemical reaction in case of a 
double-ended pipe break in the steam generator, in 
which the simultaneaus presence of NaK and water 
may induce exotherrnie and violent reactions. The 
amount of NaK involvcd is predicted tobe moderate. 
Nevertheless, this issue needs further attention. The is-
sue has also been addressed in issue No. 2 and is rated 
here as to cause some problems. 
Jssue rating: (-1.0) 
Jssue evaluation: Since the tritium inventory in the 
water coolant is moderate (of the order of one gram 
per circuit, see Jssue No. 8) leakage of water into the 
steam circuit is not a safety problem. 
Issue rating: (0.0) 
Rat-
ing 
(0.0) 
(0.0) 
( -1.0) 
(0.0) 
Table 5 (Page 10 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 10: Design for natural convection of lirst wall primary coolant 
lssue description: The Duids involved in the lirst wall cooling are helium (for BIT, BOT, and DC) and water (for WC), 
whose density is particularly sensitive to tempcrature. Moreover, the limited pressure drop due to appropriate cooling 
circuits designs, the possible elevation of thc steam generators (heat sink) relative to the ftrst wall (heat source) are effi-
cient features to enhance natural circulation. Hence, the lirst wall cooling loops can, in general, easily be designed to 
provide suflicient natural convection, suitablc for temperature transients Iimitation and afterheat removaL This may be 
more diflicult under degraded operating condition, where the use of helium would particularly need the implementation of 
suitable safety systems because of lower natural circulation capabilities, especially at reduced pressure. 
ßlan-
kct 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
ßackground 
The use of helium and the rather nar-
row channel widths require further an-
alyses on the problern of how fast an 
effective natural circulation can hc es-
tablished 
The extreme narrow channels in the 
breeding zone which are in series with 
the lirst wall coolant channels cause a 
relalively high pressure drop. First as-
sessments state that afterheat can be 
removed by natural circulation al full 
pressure and a heat sink elevation 
above the source of at least 5 m. Fur-
ther analyses will be needed on tran-
sients under abnormal conditions 
The lirst wall channels are relativcly 
large, but the helium nows in multiple 
passes (meander type) through thc lirst 
wall (as opposed to the other concepts 
with a single pass). 
The nominal outlet temperature is 325 
•c, the pressure is 15.5 MPa (satu-
ration temperature 343•C). The coo-
lant channels are rather small and in 
parallel for the entire lirst wall. The 
coolant channels in the bottom part of 
the outboard segments form upside-
down U-bends prone to steam binding 
and subsequent overheating. 
Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: Some problems are expected in es-
tablishing the natural convection in time (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: Some problems are seen in estab-
lishing the natural convection in time (-1.0). 
I ssue evaluation: Some problems are seen in estab-
lishing the natural convection in time (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: The water is ranked more favoura-
ble compared to helium and, in general, no problems 
are seen. Steam binding in parallel channels needs ana-
lyses (-0.2). 
Rat-
ing 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-0.2 
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Tablc 5 (Page 11 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 11: Design for natural convection of breeder/multiplier primary coolant 
Jssue description: The fluids involved for cooling the breeding zone are helium (for BIT, BOT), Pb-!7Li (for DC), and 
water (for WC). Again, the elevation of the steam generators (heat sink) relative lo the breeding zone (heal source) is an 
efficient feature lo enhance natural circulation. Hence, the breeding zone cooling loops can, in general, easily be designed 
to provide sufflcient natural convection, suitable mainly for afterheat removal (whereas transients play a minor rote in 
the breeding zone as opposed lo the first wall). 
ßlan-
kct 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
The helium flows in annular ducts 
downwards (cold leg), is reversed at the 
bottom of the breeder modules and 
flows upwards in the breeding rod bun-
dle (hol leg). Heal is introduced into 
the stream from structures, beryllium, 
and breeder material. The difference of 
the heat fed into the cold and hol leg 
creates the driving buoyancy force for 
the natural convection. ll is not clcar if 
flow reversal will take place and how 
fast effective cooling will be established. 
The extreme narrow channels in thc 
breeding zone which are in series with 
the first wall coolant channels cause a 
relatively high pressure drop. First as-
sessments slate thal afterheat can be 
removed by natural circulation at full 
pressure and a heat sink elevation 
above the source of at least 5 m. Fur-
ther analyses will be needed on tran-
sients under abnormal conditions (same 
argument as for first wall in Jssue No. 
10). 
The breeding channels are very !arge. 
The only concern are MI ID cffccts 
which, upon local failure of the insu-
lation layer, may cause substantial 
pressure drop and flow redistribution. 
Analyses for a similar design have 
shown that the afterheat can be re-
moved at full magnetic field by natural 
circulation if the heat sink elevation 
above the source is at least 5 m [10]. 
In addition the high heat capacity of 
the blanket (see Issue No. 12) can 
guarantee to shut off the field in time 
(e.g., within an hour). 
The nominal outlet temperature is 325 
•c, the pressure is 15.5 MPa (satu-
ration temperature 343°C); small rnar-
gin to boiling. The coolant channcls are 
hairpin type tubes with downward now 
in the front region of the breeding zone 
and upward flow in the rear region. 
This configuration requires flow re-
versal when establishing natural circu-
lation and the transient behaviour 
needs to be investigated. 
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Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: Minor problems are expectcd in cs-
tablishing the natural convection in time. f'urther 
analysis is needed ( -0.5). 
Issue evaluation: Minor problems are seen in estab-
lishing the natural convection in time. Further analysis 
is needed ( -0.5). 
Issue evaluation: Minor problems are seen in estab-
lishing the natural convection in time. Further analysis 
is necded (-0.5). 
Issue evaluation: In generat the water would be 
ranked more favourable than helium. With view to the 
required flow reversal and the small margin to boiling 
(possibility of steam binding) the same rating is ap-
plied as for the other concepts. Further analysis is 
needed ( -0.5 ). 
Rat-
ing 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.5 
Tablc 5 (Page 12 of 23). Issues c\'aluation and rating 
lssue No. 12: Ensure adeguatc thermal incrlia 
Sub-lssucs description: High thermal inertia of the blanket and cooling system makes the whole system tolerant against 
upset conditions, faults, and accidents. In most such cases one can assume that the plasma is shut down so that the 
adiabatic heat-up of portions of the blanket system due to afterheat production is an appropriate mcasure for the ther-
mal inertia. The following sub-issues are regarded: (i) heat-up of FW in case of FW LOCA, (ii) heat-up of FW in case of 
FW LOFA, (iii) heat-up of blanket segment in case of entire LOCA, (iv) heat-up of blanket segment in case of entire 
LOFA. 
ßlan-
ket 
BIT 
ßOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
Material composition and afterhcat 
production in the different materials of 
the OB blanket in segment midplane as 
tabulated in data sheets in Appendix ß 
on page 65. 
Material composition and afterhcat 
production in the different materials of 
the OB blanket in segment midplane as 
tabulated in data sheets in Appendix D 
on page 65. 
Material composition and afterhcat 
production in the different materials of 
the OB blanket in segment midp!ane as 
tabulated in data sheets in Appendix B 
on page 65. 
Material composition and afterheat 
production in the different materials of 
the OB blanket in segment midplane as 
tabulated in data sheets in Appendix ß 
on page 65. 
Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) The adiabatic FW temperature rise has not been 
evaluated but should be similar to the other con-
cepts, considerable problems ( -2.0) 
(ii) same as sub-issue i, considerable problems (-2.0) 
(iii) expected to be similar to BOT concept, no rele-
vant problems (0.0) 
(iv) same as sub-issue iii, no relevant problems (0.0) 
Subtotal: -4.0 
(i) adiabatic FW temperature rise after I min, I 0 
min, I h: 10•c, 9o·c, 4 I o·c, considerable prob-
lems (-2.0) 
(ii) same as sub-issue i, considerable problems (-2.0) 
(iii) OB segment temperature rise after I h, 10 h, 100 
h: 4o·c, 15o•c, ca. 4oo•c, no relevant problems 
(0.0) 
(iv) same as sub-issue iii, no relevant problems (0.0) 
Subtotal: -4.0 
(i) adiabalic FW temperature rise after I min, I 0 
min, I hr: 1o•c, 9o•c, 4Jo•c, considerable prob-
lems (-2.0) 
(ii) same as sub-issue i, considerable problern (-2.0) 
(iii) not assessed but expected to be similar to sub-
issue iv, some problems expected (-1.0) 
(iv) 0 B segment temperature rise after I h, I 0 h, I 00 
h: 52•c, 19o•c, ca. 6oo•c, some problems (-1.0) 
Subtotal: -6.0 
(i) The adiabatic FW temperature rise has not been 
evaluated but should be similar to the other con-
cepts, considerable problems (-2.0) 
(ii) same as sub-issue i, considerable problems ( -2.0) 
(iii) expected to be similar to DC concept, somc 
problems expected ( -1.0) 
(iv) expected to be similar to DC concept, some 
problems expectcd (- 1.0) 
Subtotal: -6.0 
Rat-
ing 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.5 
-1.5 
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Table 5 Wage 13 of 23). lssues cvaluation and rating 
lssuc No. 13: Reduce the potential for chemical reactions leading to hydrogen production and heat generation 
Issue description: The potential for hydrogen production has been considered in Issue No. 2, minimise the amount of 
chemically reactive material. In order to avoid duplication, this issue is rated as zero for all concepts, meaning that no 
additional problems or differences among concepts are identiDed at this qualitative Ievel. 
BI an-
ket 
ßiT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
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Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
I ssue evaluation: see I ssue No. 2 
Issue evaluation: see Issue No. 2 
lssue evaluation: see Issue No. 2 
Issue evaluation: see Issue No. 2 
Rat-
ing 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Table 5 (Page 14 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Jssue No. 14: Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow reduction of the FW primary coolant now 
Sub-Issues description: The FW primary coolant is helium (BIT, BOT, and DC) and water (WC). One can generally 
expect that helium is superior lo water in tcrms of plugging potential because of the water chemistry and related corro-
sion products lransport. Furthermore, the risk for plugging is enhanced, the smaller the channcl diameter is, in areas of 
sudden changes of the channel cross section, and in channels with changing temperatures along the coolant path. There-
fore, the following features are considered as sub-issues in this evaluation, regarding an OB segment onl)': (i) coolant 
medium, (ii) typical FW channel diameter or cross section, (iii) nurober and degree of channel restrictions or enlarge-
ments, (iv) channel wall temperature gradienls in downstream direction. 
ßlan-
kct 
ß!T 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background Suh-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) coolant: helium, no relevant problems 
(ii) circular coolant channels with 17.5 mm diameter, 24 mm pitch, no rele-
vant problems 
(iii) The box has about 2x250 parallel channels (approx. 3 m long) with 1000 
transillans with a cross section ratio of about 25, no relevant problems 
(iv) The channcl wall temperature will drop in the side wall channels from 
about 500'C to ca. 315'C (rnean of inletfoutlet), sorne problems 
Sub-issues rnting (global): 
No or rninor problems are expected; if any, then due to sub-issue iv. (-0.25) 
(i) coolant: helium, no relevant problems 
(ii) reetangular channels with about 16 rnrn hydraulic diarneter, 24 rnrn 
pitch, no relevant problerns 
(iii) The box has about 2x250 parallel channels (approx. 3 m long) with 500 
transillans with a cross section ralio of 30, and 500 transitions with a 
ratio of 7. There are further transitions to the breeding zone coolant 
channels (sec Issue No. 15), no relevant problerns 
(iv) The channel wall temperature will drop in the side wall channels from 
about SOO'C lo 275'C (mean of inletfoutlet), worse than average, some 
problcrns 
Sub-issues rating (global): 
Noor rninor problerns are expected; if any, then due to sub-issue iv. (-0.25) 
(i) coolant: helium, no relevant problems 
(ii) square channels with 25 mm hydraulic diameter, 30 mm pitch (much 
better than average), no problems 
(iii) The box has about 2x50 parallel channels (approx. 10m long) with 800 
transitions with cross section ratlos of about 12, no problerns 
(iv) The channel wail lemperalure will drop in the side wall channels from 
about 500'C to about 300 'C (mean of inletfoutlet), sorne problerns 
Sub-issues rating (global): 
Noor minor problcms are expected; if any, then due lo sub-issue iv. (-0.25) 
(i) coolant: pressurised water, minor problern 
(ii) circular coolant channels with 8 mm diameter, 28 mm pitch, minor 
problems 
(iii) The box has aboul 430 parallel channels (2. 7 m long) with 860 transi-
tions with a cross section ratio of about 270 (rnuch worse than average), 
rninor problern 
(iv) The channel wall temperature will drop in the side wall channels from 
about470'C lo about 300'C (rnean of Pb-17Li inlelfoutlet), some prob-
lems 
Sub-issues rating (global): 
Minor proble1ns are expected, mainly due to sub-issues i and iv, to sorne ex-
tent due to ii. (-0.5) 
Rat-
ing 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-0.25 
-0.5 
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Tablc 5 (Page 15 of 23). Issucs evaluation and rating 
Jssue No. 15: Minimise the risk for plugging and local flow reduclion of breeder /multiplier coolant flow 
Sub-Issues description: The breederfmultiplier coolant is helium (BIT, BOT), the breeder (Pb-17Li) itself (DC), and water 
(WC). One can generally expecl that helium is superior to Pb-17Li and water in terms of plugging potential because of 
the liquid meta! and water chemistry and related corrosion products lransport. Comparing Pb-17Li with water, it is not 
clear at present, which one is worse. f'urthermore, (as already discussed in Issue No. 14), the risk for plugging is en-
hanced, the smaller the channel diameter is, in areas of sudden changes of the channel cross section, and in channel 
sections with decreasing channel wall tempcratures in downstream direction. lf elaborated orificing would be required for 
flow adjustment, this would make the design sensitive to plugging. Therefore, the following features are considered as 
sub-issues in this evaluation, regarding an 013 segment only: (i) coolant medium, (ii) typical breeder fmultiplier channel 
diamcter or cross section, (iii) number and dcgree of channel restrictions or enlargements, (iv) channel wall temperature 
gradients, (v) elaborated orificing required. 
BI an-
ket 
BIT 
BOT 
Back-
ground 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
coolant: helium, no relevant problems (0.0) 
poloidal annular (cold leg) and circular (hot leg, with 7 breeder rods) coolant 
channels with typically 20 cm 2 cross section area, no problems (0.0) 
The breeding zone has 83 parallel channels (about 24 m long), groups of typical-
ly 11 such chann~ls being connected to common inlet and out!et headers. There 
isatotal of 166 lransilions with cross section ratio of at most 5, no problems 
(0.0) 
(iv) The channel wall temperature tends to continuously rise, so that a plate-out of 
helium-born particles in the blanket segment is unlikely, no problems (0.0) 
(v) Elaborated orificing not required, no problems (0.0) 
Subtotal: 0.0 
(i) coolant: helium, no relevant problern (0.0) 
(ii) convoluted radialftoroidal reetangular coolant channels with typically 0.24 cm2 
cross section area, imbedded in sandwich steel plates, some problems ( -1.0) 
(iii) The breeding zone has about 7200 parallel channels (typically 2 m long), groups 
of approx. 40 such channels being connected lo common inlet and outlel head-
ers. There are about 14400 transitions with cross seclion ratios of the order of 
40, no relevant problems (0.0) 
(iv) The channel wall temperature drops in radial channel sections by approximately 
100 •c, some problems (-1.0) 
(v) Elaborated orificing for temperature control is needed, some problems ( -1.0) 
S ubtotal: -3.0 
Rat-
ing 
0.0 
-0.75 
DC (i) coolant: Pb-17 Li, some problems ( -1.0) -0.5 
WC 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
poloidal reetangular coolanl channels with typically 190 cm2 (front channels) and 
300 cm2 (rear channels) cross section area, no problems (0.0) 
The breeding zone has 18 rear channels (downward flow) connected in series lo 
6 front channcls via the return chamber at the bottom. There are no abrupt 
transitions with !arge cross section ratios, no problems (0.0) 
The channel wall temperature tends to continuously rise, so that significant de-
posits in the blanket segmenl are notlikely, no problems (0.0) 
Etaborated orificing not required, however, some risk from local flow reduction 
due to coating failure. ( -1.0) 
Subtotal: -2.0 
(i) coolant: pressurised water, some problems (-1.0) 
(ii) poloidal circular coolant channels with 0.95 cm2 cross section area, minor or 
some problems (-0.8) 
(iii) The breeding zone has 205 hairpin type coolant tubes which are connected lo 
comrnon inlet and outlet headers. There are 410 transitions with cross section 
ratios of approx. 10 lo the inlet header and 15 to the outlet header (average), no 
problems (0.0) 
(iv) The channel wall temperature decreases in downstream direction from ca. 45o·c 
lo perhaps 300"C, some problems (-1.0) 
(v) Elaborated orificing not required, no problems (0.0) 
Subtotal: -2.8 
Note: Remark: Sub-issue iii has been ignored in the sublotals because of zeros throughout. 
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-0.7 
Tablc 5 (Page 16 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 16: Reduce the long term waste 
Issue description: Large amounts of radioactive material are produced in in-vessel components, mainly in the blanket. 
Within the blanket the highest specific activity will occur in the structural material which has a relatively short mission 
time and the capability for recycling seems to be low. On the other hand, there is a good perspective to reuse breeder and 
especially multiplier material. Hence, the structure will dominate the waste problern along with process waste evolving 
from recycling of reusable materials. 
ßlan-
kct 
BIT 
noT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
(a) The concept has Al in tbe brecder 
material as long term waste. (b) neryl-
lium is supposed to be recycled at 90 
%. Due to the !arge beryllium invcnto-
ry ( on the order of 500 tons) I arge 
amounts of process waste will be prod-
uced. 
(a) Ar-39 is produced from impurities 
in the breeder material and dominates 
the activation parameters (except for 
the gamma dose) in the I lo 100 year 
range. (b) Al-26 is produced from sili-
con in the breeder material and domi-
nates the gamma dose rate in the long 
term (> 100 years). (c) Co-58, Co-60, 
Mn-54, Al-26, Ba-137 dominate the 
gamma dose rate in beryllium in the 
100 years range. (d) Minimise the ura-
nium impurities in Be to avoid alpha-
emitting nuclides like Pu-239, Pu-240, 
Am-241. 
(a) Long term activation parametcrs in 
Pb- 17Li are dominated by Pb isotopes 
(204 and 205) or producls of Pb 
(Hg-203, Tl-204, Bi-208). (b) Minimise 
Bi to reduce Po production. (c) Min-
imise Ag and Cd impurities, (d) Pu-
rification and reuse of Pb-17 Li can 
minirnise the long term waste from the 
liquid breeder. (e) The wasle problern 
for structural material is assumed to be 
similar for all concepts. (f) The Al 
bearing coating rnay become dorninat-
ing in the long term (> 105 years) be-
cause of AL-26 and, perhaps, requires 
separation before disposal. 
No detailed analysis is available in 
WG6a, but the issue is considered to be 
equivalent to that of DC, although the 
amount of Pb-l7Li is smaller. 
Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: There will bc substantial problems 
with recycling of breeder and beryllium due to (a) and 
(b) as weil as corresponding concerns (c) and (d) Iisted 
for noT; (-1.5). 
I ssue evaluation: There will be substantial problems 
with recycling of breeder and beryllium due to (a) to 
(d); (-1.5). 
Issue evaluation: Some problems are encountered due 
to (a) to (d), but mainly because of (e); (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: Same arguments and rating as DC; 
(-1.0). 
Rat-
ing 
-1.5 
-1.5 
-1.0 
-1.0 
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Table 5 (Page 17 of 23). Issucs cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 17: Minimise the contact dose rate of heat Iransportsystems 
Sub-lssues description: The heat Iransportsystems carry helium (BIT, ßOT, DC), Pb-17U (DC, WC for tritium ex-
traction only), and water (WC). The concerns with helium are sputlered products which have lo be removed on-line in 
sizeable lilter units. The filters, in turn, may have tobe regenerated from time to time. Furthermore, tritium leakage and 
permcation through pipe walls must be considered, both during normal operation and maintenance periods. The major 
problern with the Pb-17Li is the contact gamma-dose rate (of the order of several hundreds of Svfh aftcr 10 sandstill 
several Svfh after I day) which makes rooms with Pb-17Li components inaccessiblc (which is not an operational problern 
but only for maintenance and repair). Tritium permeation through component walls may require extra suction systems 
(double pipe walls or conduits). Water carrying systems prohibit access during normal operation, basically because of 
the N-16 activity (as with pressurised watcr reactors). This, however, decays within a few hours anrl is no severe problern 
for maintenance. In short, the following sub-issues are regarded, assuming the relative severeness of the sub-issues to be 
proportional to the coolant inventory: (i) helium purification and routine tritium escape, (ii) Pb-17Li gamma-dose rate 
and routinc tritium escape, (iii) water gamma-dose rate. 
BI an-
ket Background Sub-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
ß!T 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
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(i) The helium invcntory has not been assessed but 
is assumed to be similar as that in BOT. Some 
problems arc expected. ( -1.0) 
(ii) No Pb- 17Li inventory, sub-issue is not applica-
ble. (0.0) 
(iii) No water inventory, sub-issue is not applicable. 
(0.0) 
Subtotal: -I .0 
(i) The helium inventory is about 20000 kg, some 
problems (-1.0) are expected. 
(ii) No Pb-17Li inventory, sub-issue is not applica-
ble. (0.0) 
(iii) No water inventory, sub-issue is not applicable. 
(0.0) 
Subtotal: -1.0 
(i) The helium inventory in the FW cooling system 
is about 6400 kg. Some problems are expected 
but less than for BIT and BOT. (-0.5) 
(ii) The Pb-17Li inventory is about 15,000,000 kg, 
i.e., the largest of all concepts. On-line or bypass 
removal of corrosion products, in particular Al 
(with the gamma emitter i\l-28) from insulation 
Jayers, is envisaged. Considerable problems are 
expected. (-2.0) 
(iii) No water invenlory, sub-issue is not applicable. 
(0.0) 
Subtotal: -2.5 
(i) No helium coolant, sub-issue is not applicable. 
(0.0) 
(ii) The Pb-17Li inventory is about 8,000,000 kg. 
Some problems are expected but less than for 
DC because of much smaller loops and Oow 
rates. (-1 .0) 
(iii) The water inventory is about 142,000 kg. The 
N-16 activity needs attention. Some problems are 
expected. ( -1.0) 
Subtotal: -2.0 
Rat-
ing 
-0.3 
-0,3 
-0.8 
-0.6 
Tablc 5 (Page 18 of 23). lssucs cvaluation and rating 
lssue No. 18: Limit the length and complexity of circuits which carry activatcd nuids 
lssue description: With view to the tremendous pipe length (the total pipe length of a primary cooling system approaches 
several kilometres, typically 5 km) the pipework bears a safety hazard not only in terms of personnel exposure (Issue 
No. 17) but also in the sense of potentially increasing the frequency for abnormal situations. Besides the pipe length also 
typical diameters, wall thickness, number of welds and joints, and the accessibility for quality assurance and surveillance 
measures nced to be considered. The issue obtains extra appreciation in the design group (WG4) and reliability assess-
ment group (WG6b), but the safcty implications should be discussed separately at a moderate imporlance Ievel. Besides, 
the circuitry is in the first place a matter of plant Iayout and is not blanket concept immanent. 
Blan-
ke! 
DIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
The concept has 2 circuits for first wall 
cooling and 2 circuits for the brceding 
zone, making a total of 4. Typical hol 
leg diameters are 1.9 to 2.2 m, typical 
feeder diameters are 0.28 m. The total 
number of coolant feeders per scgment 
is 8, plus 2 for the purge gas. 
The concept has a total of 18 circuits, 6 
for the inboard and 12 for the out-
board, being arranged in 2x3 and 2x6 
sub-systems for redundancy purposcs. 
Typical pipe diameters are 1.1 m for 
the hot Jegs and 0.3 m for the feedcrs. 
The total number of coolant feedcrs is 
only 4, plus 2 small feeders for the 
purge gas. 
The concept has 10 helium cooling cir-
cuits for the first wall (4 for thc in-
board and 6 for the outboard), and the 
same number of Pb-17Li circuits for 
the seif-cooled breeding zone. Typical 
pipe diameters are 0.8 m for the hclium 
hot legs and 0.8 to 1.15 m for thc Pb-
17Li hot legs. Feeders range from 0.13 
to 0.33 m. The total number of coolant 
feeders is 6 per segment, plus two small 
lines for liquid meta! draining. 
The concept has 2 circuits for Drst 
wall cooling and 4 circuits for the 
breeding zone, making a total of 6 wa-
ter cooling circuits. There are 4 smaller 
Pb-17Li Joops for tritium extraclion. 
Typical diameters are 0.4 to 0.8 m for 
the hot Jegs and 0.1 m for the fecders. 
The total number of coolant feedcrs 
per outboard segment is 6 (central seg-
ments) and 8 (lateral segments) with 
double and triple walls. 
Sub-issncs Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: The tremendous pipe diameter and 
the !arge number of feeders, connecting the segments 
and the ring collectors, cause similar problems as in 
othcr concepts, despitc the relativcly simple circuit de-
sign; (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: The re1atively !arge number of cir-
cuits increases the complexity compared to BIT but 
makes pipes and components smaller and easier to 
maintain. Overall, the circuitry is more complex than 
in pressurised water reactors causing some safety 
problems; (-1.0). 
Jssue evaluation: The relalively !arge number of cir-
cuits increases the complexity compared to BIT and 
WC but makes pipcs and components smaller and eas-
ier to maintain. Overall, the circuitry is more complex 
than in pressurised water reactors causing some safety 
problems; (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: The external loop system is perhaps 
the one closest to conventional designs but still with a 
mix of water and liquid meta! piping. The feeders are 
extremely complex because of their staggered config-
uration, making quality assurance and in-service in-
spection impossible. Therefore, the rating is the same 
as for the other concepts; (-1.0). 
Rat-
ing 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
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'fable 5 (Page 19 of 23). Issues cYaluation and rating 
lssue No. 19: Extend weil established technology 
Sub-Jssues description: New technologies bear uncertainties in plant control, prediction and control of abnormal situ-
ations and, thereby, call for extra margins and provisions in safety assessment. Most of the concerns with new technolo-
gies in the blanket systems are treated in other working groups, especially in the risk assessment group (WG6b). How-
ever, in their synergism, new technologies can impede safety. Therefore, the following sub-issues are considered here in a 
qualitative way: (i) corrosion and sputter product transport, (ii) durability of coatings with regard to tritium control, (iii) 
impact of MHD on thermal-hydraulics and temperature control, (iv) reliability of valves and pumps on demand, (v) 
reliability of instrumentation and leak control, (vi) material fatigue, mainly at joints, (vii) hazards from steam generators. 
BI an-
ket 
DIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background Suh-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
(i) some problems with helium systems (-1.0) 
(ii) considerable problems with helium steam generators (-2.0) 
(iii) not applicable (0.0) 
(iv) some problems with helium technology, particularly blowers (-1.0) 
(v) some problems with leak control (-1.0) 
(vi) considerable problems with first wall fabrication (deep drilling, bending, 
welding) (-2.0) 
(vii) minor problems with helium steam generators (-0.5) 
Subtotal: -7.5 
(i) some problems with helium systems (-1.0) 
(ii) considerable problems with helium steam generators (-2.0) 
(iii) not applicable (0.0) 
(iv) some problems with helium technology, particularly blowers (-1.0) 
(v) some problems with leak control (-1.0) 
(vi) some problems with first wall fabrication (diffusion welding) ( -1.0) 
(vii) some problems with helium steam generators because primary pressure 
higher than secondary pressure. (-1.0) 
Subtotal: -7.0 
Rat-
ing 
-1.1 
-1.0 
(i) some problems with helium systems and Pb-17Li systems (-1.0) -1.6 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
somc problems with helium steam generators (lower then IHT and BOT) 
because of relatively low temperature (-1.0) 
considerable problems (-2.0) 
considcrable problems with Pb-i7Li technoiogy (-2.0) 
some problems with leak control (-1.0) 
considerable problems with first wall fabrication (diffusion welding, 
bending of thick wall) (-2.0) 
considerable problems with l'b-17Li/NaKfwater steam generators (-2.0) 
Subtotal: -11.0 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
not relevant in water systems, vast experience (0.0) -1.1 
considerable problems with cooling tubes in segments (-2.0) 
minor problems because of low flow velocities (-0.5) 
no problems with water technology, some problems with Pb-17Li lech-
nology (smaller loops compared to DC). (-1.0) 
considerable problems with Jeak control in water/Pb-17Li piping and 
manifolding (-2.0) 
considerable problems with first wall fabrication (deep drilling, brazing, 
bending) and severe tube fabrication (bending, tube sheet welding) (-2.0) 
no problems with water fsteam generators (0.0) 
Subtotal: -7.5 
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Table 5 (I>age 20 of 23). Jssucs evaluation and rating 
lssue No. 20: Provide for redundancy of cooling systems 
lssue description: The aim is to minimise the uncertainties in controlling abnormal operation by redundant andfor diverse 
cooling systems. Diverse cooling systems supplying the same blanket segment help inherently in short term afterheat 
removal in case of LOCAs or LOFAs almoderate tcmperature transients. They, thereby, simplify the incidental seenar-
ios to be designed for in the safety systems and protection systems Iayout. 
ßlan-
ket 
BIT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
Two independent hetium systems cool 
lhe segmentbox (each one feeding in 
an alternate way half of the segment 
box cooting channels). 2 independcnt 
hetium systems cool the breeding zone. 
Two independent helium systems cool 
in series the segment box and the 
breeding zone (each one feeding half of 
the segment box and breeding zone 
channels). 
Due to the choice of two cooting fluids, 
hetium for the segment box and Iead-
Iithium for the breeding zone, there is 
an independence between the two cool-
ing systems. 
Two independent water systems cool 
the segment box and the breeding zone 
( one for the segment box, the othcr one 
for the breeding zone). 
Suh-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: The redundancy function, from the 
safety point of view (in case of LOPA), is provided for 
allthe concepts. The conceptual design way to ful!il 
this function is different, though, but the overatt func-
tion is provided. All the concepts seem to be equiv-
alent from this point of view and no relevant problern 
is seen; (0.0). 
lssue evaluation: samerationale as for BIT; (0.0). 
lssue evaluation: samerationale as for UJT; (0.0). 
Issue evaluation: same rationale as for BIT; (0.0). 
Rat-
ing 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
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Table 5 (Page 21 of 23). Issues {~Yaluation and rating 
Issue No. 21: Minimise the tritium permeation to steam systems 
Issue description: The aim is to minimise the radioaclive release during normal operation. Tritium permeating to the 
stearn systern is considered to be released to the environment, for which an upper Iimit of I 0 to 20 Ci per day is presently 
assurned to be acceptable during normal operation. The perrneation rate through stearn generator tubes depends on 
lernperature, tritiurn partial pressure in the prirnary coolant, coatings, tube material and surface area. Leakage has to be 
taken into account if the primary prcssure is higher then the pressure on the steam side (compare Issue No. 9). Those 
parameters are specific to the blanket concepls and will be evaluated in a consistent way by WGJ. Yet, ]arge uncerlain-
ties will remain and the safety implications have to be addressed separately. 
BI an-
ket 
ßJT 
BOT 
DC 
WC 
Backgrol!nd 
The tritium permeation from the brceder rods inlo the coolant 
has been determined for lhe old 19 rod bundle geometry and 
with a He, H2, HT chemistry in the purge gas. The calculated 
permeation was 25 gjd. All hclium cooled blankets assume op-
timistically, that a permeation reduction factor (PRF) of 400 in 
the steam generators can be realised. With this assumption a 
permeation to lhe steam system of < 10 Ci/d can be achieved, 
if the necessary tritium activity Iimit of ca. J0- 3 Pa is not ex-
ceeded. This can be done by adopting a waler chemistry in the 
purge gas and the coolant. In these conditions, a PRF of 10 
can be expected on the brceder rods (pcrmeation < I 0 g/d). 
Furthermore, 99 % of the permeated trilium will be present in 
form of HTO (not permeable), so that in theory the 10 Ci/d 
Iimit ( or 20) could be respected. The necessary helium purifica-
tion system is of the same size as for BOT. The largest uncer-
tainty will be the permealion from the first wall into the coo-
lant (see descriptions (b) and (c) for DOT) 
(a) The tritium Iosses to the steam generators have been calcu-
lated accounting for lhe Iosses into the main helium coolant 
system (blanket and first wall) and the effect of the helium pu-
rificalion system (preoxidised incoloy 800, no account for triti-
um dilution caused by hydrogen). The so calculated tritiurn 
Iosses to the steamjwater circuit are 22 Ci/d. (b) Large uncer-
tainties are associated with tritium permeation through the first 
wall into the helium coolant. Estimates range from I to 100 
g/d. Values substantially !arger than 1 gjd would require addi-
tionalmeans for tritium conlrol. (c) Another problern are tem-
perature transients which can exert a temporary detrimental ef-
fect on the oxide barrier of the sleam generator tubes, 
(a) Similar problems as for BOT exist for the helium firsl wall 
cooling system, however on a lower Ievel due to the smaller he-
Jium inventory. (b) Tritium permeation from the NaK system 
in the Pb17LijNaKjwater steam generators requires also aper-
meation barrier on the water side with a permeation reduction 
factor of at least I 00 in order to respect the l 0 Ci/d Iimit allo-
cated for this system. 
(a) The maximum acceptable concentration of tritium in the 
water coolant is assumed to range between 0.1 to 1.0 Cijkg. 
(b) Water leakage from the primary circuit (15.5 MPa) to the 
secondary circuit (7 MPa) is very uncertain and can vary by 
orders of magnitude. Values for water leaks could be 0.1 kg/h 
per steam gencrator, leading to a tritium leakage in 6 steam 
generators of 15 Ci/d [4]. 
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Sub-issucs Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: see comment 
for BOT; (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: Large uncer-
lainties allow at this stage 
only a qualitative and uniform 
rating for all the concepts; 
some problems are expected; 
(-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: see comment 
for BOT; (-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: see comment 
for BOT; (-1.0). 
Rat-
ing 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
Table 5 (l'age 22 of 23). Issues cvaluation and rating 
Issue No. 22: Minimise the release of activation products in case of loss of heat sink 
Issues description: Complete loss of heat sink is an cvent in the BDBA domain in which heat rejection via the blanket 
cooling systems (atleast for part of the torus) is lost for a prolonged period of time. The amount of decay heat and the 
thermal inertia of the blanket are the driving parameters for temperature rises which are inlluenced by the blanket con-
ccpt. The effectiveness of the ernergency heal removal means (radiation to the VV or cryostat, conduction to the intact 
blanket segrnents (if any), cooling of VV or cryostat walls) are then a matter of plant design beyond BCSE. Favourable 
features of the blanket, like low decay heat, high thermal inertia (I ssue No. 12), and !arge rnargin before structure melt-
ing alleviate the design and licensing. 
BI an-
ket 
lliT 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
(a) This corresponds to a complcte loss of coolant which anni-
hilates the convective thermal heat extraction. (b) Bach of the 
designs ernploy more than one independent cooling system for 
the !irst wall and the breeder (sce issue No. 20). This redundant 
cooling rnay act as an ernergency system, if an ef!icient thermal 
link between the !irst wall and brccder is available, and if only 
one systern is affected. (c) 1t is shown that conduction or radi-
ation to surrounding structures like vacuum vessel or cryostat 
is already an important way for hcat removal so that the integ-
rity of the structures is generally not endangered. (d) It is nec-
essary to provide an ef!icient automatic plasma shutdown de-
vice to avoid excessive temperature transients in the blanket in 
case of total loss of heat sink in an entire segment. 
Comrnents (a) to (d) given for BIT apply. 
Comments (a) to (d) given for BIT apply. 
Comments (a) to (d) given for BIT apply. 
Suh-issues Evaluation (Rating) 
Issue evaluation: The issue 
raises sorne safety problems; 
(-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: The issue 
raises some safety problems; 
(-1.0). 
Remark: With respect to after-
heat removal (cornment c in 
the background column) BIT 
and BOT may have advantage 
over DC and WC because of 
the lower decay heat addressed 
in lssue No. 12. 
Issue evaluation: The issue 
raises some safety problems; 
(-1.0). 
Issue evaluation: The issue 
raises some safety problems; 
(-1.0). 
Rat-
ing 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
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Tablc 5 (Page 23 of 23). Issucs evaluation and rating 
Issue No. 23: Minimise the release of activation products in case of DBAs 
Issue description: The worst case accident scenario for an in-vessel LOCA is considered as design basis accident. 
BI an-
ket 
ß!T 
BOT 
DC 
wc 
Background 
Worst case accident scenario: Rupturc of a breeder module: 
• pressurisation of box (pressure relief?) 
• hurst of box 
• pressurisation of vacuum vessel by both first wall cooling circuits and at 
least by 1 breeding zone cooling circuit (perhaps both of them) 
Sub-issues 
Evaluation 
(Rating) 
• Release of a small fraction (kg range) of beryllium from one module into 
I ssue evalu-
ation: lf pres-
surisation can 
be handled, 
some problems 
( a little less 
than BOT), 
rating: (-0.8). vv 
• Afterheat removal to be verified 
• Be/air reactions unlikely or minor 
• Befwater reactions only in case of water access from other components 
• Activation products mobilisation from helium inventory and from small 
fractions of Be and breeder from a single module 
Worst case accident Scenario: Rupture of first wall (both cooling systems) to-
wards the inside: 
I ssue evalu-
ation: I f pres-
surisation can 
be handled, 
some problem; 
rating: ( -1.0). 
• pressurisation of box 
• rupture of box (despite the design goal to withstand the design pressure) 
• pressurisatlon of VV by both PW/DZ cooling sub-system (propagation to 
other segments unlikely) 
• afterheat removal to be verified 
• Befair reactions unlikely or minor 
• Befwater reactions only in case of water access from othcr components 
• Activation products mobilisation from helium inventory and from small 
fractions of Be and breeder from a single module (both are in form of small 
pebbles, leading to a !arger fraction that can be liberated compared to ß!T). 
Worst case accident scenario: Rupture of first wall (both cooling sys-
tems) towards the inside: 
• pressurisation of box 
• pressurisation of Pb-17Li cooling system (including bypass loops to 
tritium extraction) 
• rupture of box (despite design goal to withstand helium pressure) 
• pressurisation of VV by both first wall cooling sub-system (propa-
gation to other segments unlikely) 
• release of Pb-17Li into VV, in the worst case on the order of 200 
m3. 
• chemical reactions only in case of ingress of air or water from other 
components, minor reactions only 
• activation products mobilisation from Pb-17 Li (Po-210, J-lg-203, 
J-1-3) 
Worst case accident scenario: Rupture of FW or rupture of cooling 
tube towards the inside of the segrnent box: 
• pressurisation of box (pressure relief is an open question) 
• Pb-17Lifwater reactions 
• failure of box 
• pressurisation of VV by water vapour 
• release of Pb-17Li into VV, but much less than for DC 
• considerable Pb-17Lifwater reactions in the VV 
• activation products mobilisation from Pb-17Li (Po-210, J-lg-203, 
H-3) 
• limited chemical energy and limited hydrogen production 
Issue evaluation: If 
pressurisation of con-
tainment can be han-
dled, some problems; if 
containment fails or 
leaks, tolerable radio-
logical hazards but 
very difficult to prove. 
In any case severe cle-
an-up problem, consid-
erable problems; rat-
ing: ( -2.0). 
lssue evaluation: Jf 
pressurisation of con-
tainment can be han-
dled, some problems; if 
containment fails or 
leaks, tolerable radio-
logical hazards but 
very difficult to prove. 
In any case severe cle-
an-up problem, consid-
erable problems; rat-
ing: (-2.0). 
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Rat-
ing 
-0.8 
-1.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
6. Results and Future Developments 
6.1 Total ratings and comparison of concepts 
A summary of the ratings and the weighted ratings for the 23 issues is listed in Ta-
blc 7 on page 51 along with the summation to the overall ratings of safety issues 
(OSR) according to equation 1 in Chapter 3. The OSR and the normalised overall 
safety ratings ( osr) according to equation 2 rcad as follows: 
Table 6. Overall safety ratings (OSR) and normalised overall safety ratings 
(osr) 
BIT BOT DC wc 
OSR -110.1 -114.5 -120 -119.5 
osr 0.638 0.623 0.605 0.607 
The individual safety issues ratings have been obtained by consensus within WG6a, 
except for the rating of issue No. 3 (minimise the occurrence of LOCA due to ex-
treme disruptions), where the mean of the voting from two WG6a members was 
taken which was then accepted by the third WG6a member (sec footnote to 
Table 5 on page 22, issue No. 3). The following results were obtained: 
• The overall safety ratings (OSR) for the four concepts range from -110.1 to -120 
points. This is a maximum deviation of 5 % from the mean rating. 
• The mean value of the overall safety ratings (-116 points) reaches 38 % of the 
theorctically worst rating which is -304 points. 
• The normalised overall safety rating (osr) on a scale from 0 to 1 for the four 
concepts is even tighter and differs by 3.3 percent points only. 
• The difference among the solid breeder group (4.4 points in favour of BIT vs. 
BOT) and especially the liquid metal breeder group (0.5 points in favour of WC 
vs. DC) is marginal. 
• There is a slight advantage for the solid breeder blankets as compared to the 
liquid metal blankets in terms of safety, but again the difference is marginal. 
• The big penalty points in a direct comparison of BIT vs. BOT, DC vs. WC, and 
(BIT, BOT vs. DC, WC) arc presented in Table 8 on page 52. The major con-
ccrns in which the penalty points in the direct contest are equal to, or exceed, 5 
points are listed below: 
6. Rcsults and Future Dcvclopmcnts 45 
Issue No. l: Large fluids internal energy (BIT, BOT inferior to DC, WC) 
Issue No. 2: Amount of chemically reactivc material (DC, WC inferior to 
BIT, BOT; and WC inferior to DC) 
lssue No. 4: Mechanical cnergy release from primary coolant (BIT, BOT in-
ferior to DC, WC) 
Issue No. 5: Activation products in solid blanket materials (BIT, BOT inferi-
or to DC, WC) 
lssue No. 9: Events due to failure inside the steam generator (DC inferior to 
WC) 
Issue No. 23: Release of activation products in case of DBAs (DC, WC inferi-
or to BIT, BOT) 
• Overall the score is extremely tight and not free from subjective influences, so 
that a ranking of the concepts in terms of Ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th place is not appro-
priate with view to safety. 
6.2 Areas of future developments in blanket safety 
From the identification and evaluation of the safety concerns a number of future 
activities evolved to be studied in more detail in the course of further blanket devel-
opment which could be addressed in this comparative study qualitatively only. 
These future tasks related to safety (which have to be complemented by tasks evolv-
ing from other working groups) are outlined below. Some of them are common to 
all the four blanket concepts and are listed in a first block (Section 6.2.1) in the 
order of their appearance in the issues evaluation Table 5 on page 22. The others 
are specific to particular blanket concepts and are presented in additional blocks 
pertaining to the BIT, BOT, DC, and WC concept, respectively. An overview of the 
tasks is given in Table 9 on page 54. 
6.2.1 Future activities common to all blanket concepts 
- Analysis of the consequences of extreme disruptions on the blanket structure in-
tegrity, i.e., refinement of analytical models in terms of physics phenomena, me-
chanical boundary conditions, design improvements, material characteristics (is-
sue No. 3). 
- Structural materials development towards low activation material (issue No. 5). 
- Devclopment of models for tritium implantation, in and permeation through, the 
first wall from the plasma side and assessment of tritium inventory in the first 
wall (issue No. 7). 
- Analyses of the first wall tcmperature rises for LOCA and LOFA transients at 
different shutdown scenarios, including the influence of thermal contact to the 
breeding zone (issue No. 12). 
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- Analyses of the temperature transients for complete Joss of heat sink events for 
different plasmashutdown seenarios and different heat removal mechanisms (ra-
diation to the vacuum vessel or cryostat, conduction to the intact blanket seg-
ments, cooling of vacuum vessel or cryostat walls), (issue No. 22). 
- Study of the worst case accident seenarios for LOCA events with escape of triti-
um and activation products into the vacuum vessel or other Containment com-
partments, transport and release paths to the environment, and potential dose to 
thc public (issuc No. 23). 
6.2.2 Additional activities for the BIT concept 
- Analyses of depressurisation proccsses, i.e., pressure and temperature transients 
in containment compartments (vacuum vessel, cryostat, loop compartments), re-
quired expansion volumes and relief devices (issues No. 1 and 4). 
- Establish seenarios and analyse berylliumjwater and berylliumfair reactions in 
case of water or air ingress into the breeder cooling system and simultaneaus 
failure of the beryllium cladding (issue No. 3). 
- Study the potential and technical means to minimise the impurities in beryllium 
multiplier (in particular Co, Al, Fe, U) to reduce the activation products (issues 
No. 5 and 16). 
- Develop means for on-linc removal of sputter products from the main coolant 
and from purge gas (issues No. 5 and 17). 
- Study the tritium invcntory and release mechanisms in beryllium multiplier and 
their dependence on beryllium structure and parameters (issue No. 7). 
- Study the natural convection capability of the first wall helium cooling including 
the transition from forced flow to natural convection flow (issue No. 1 0). 
- Study the natural convection capability of the breeding zone helium cooling in-
cluding the transition from forced flow to natural convection flow with possible 
flow reversal (issue No. 11). 
- Develop economical recycle techniques for activatcd bcryllium and solid breeder 
material to reduce the long term waste (issue No. 16). 
- Refine models and verify tritium control in the primary coolant (permeation 
from the breeder into thc coolant and permeation through the first wall from the 
plasma, purge gas chemistry) including tritium Iosses through the steam genera-
tor tube walls, permeation barrier effectiveness, durability, leakage (issue No. 
21 ). 
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6.2.3 Additional activities for the BOT concept 
The additional activities for thc BOT concept are, in essence, repcatcd from the BIT 
concept with minor concept-related differences in regard to beryllium chemical re-
actions (2nd paragraph below), natural convection flow (6th par.), and flow maldis-
tribution (7th par.). 
- Analyses of depressurisation processes, i.c., pressure and temperature transients 
in containment compartments (vacuum vessel, cryostat, loop compartments), re-
quired expansion volumes and relief devices. (issues No. l and 4). 
- Investigation of berylliumjwater and berylliumfair reactions with identification 
of seenarios in terms of masses involved, contact modes, reaction condition, and 
chemical reaction consequences with view to hydrogen production and tritium 
rcleasc (issue No. 2). 
- Study the potential and technical means to minimise the impurities in beryllium 
multiplier (in particular Co, Al, Fe, U) to reduce the activation products (issues 
No. S and 16). 
- Devclop means for on-line removal of sputter products from the main coolant 
and from purge gas (issues No. S and 17). 
- Study the tritium inventory and release mechanisms in beryllium multiplier and 
their dependence on beryllium structure and parameters (issue No. 7). 
- Study the natural convection capability of the first wall and breeding zone heli-
um cooling (both being in scries) including the transition from forced flow to 
natural convection flow (issues No. 10 and 11). 
- Study the effect of fabrication tolerances, modelling uncertainties, and partial 
plugging on flow maldistribution in parallel coolant channels with view to tem-
perature control in structurc, breeder, and multiplier (issues No. 14 and 1 5). 
- Develop economical recycle techniques for activated beryllium and solid breeder 
material to reduce the long term waste (issue No. 16). 
- Refine models and verify tritium control in the primary coolant (permeation 
through the first wall from the plasma, purge gas chemistry) including tritium 
Iosses through the steam generator tube walls, permeation barrier effectiveness, 
durability, leakage (issue No. 21). 
6.2.4 Additional activities for the DC concept 
- Study NaKjwater reactions in steam gcnerators and their potential for darnage 
propagation, including steamjwater ingress into the Pb-17Li cooling system, e.g., 
prcssure pulses, pressure relicf deviccs, etc. (issues No. 2 and 9). 
- Study the build-up of activation products in Pb-17Li with consideration of real-
istic in-corejex-core seq uenccs and opcrational cycles. Dcvelop techniques for on-
line removal of activation products like Hg, Bi, Po (issue No. 6). 
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- Develop means for on-line removal of sputtcr products from the first wall heli-
um coolant stream (issues No. 6 and 17). 
- Study thc natural convcction capability of the first wall helium cooling including 
the transition from forccd flow to natural convection flow (issue No. I 0). 
- Study the natural convection capability of the Pb-17Li breeding circuit including 
the transition from forced flow to natural convection flow, considering MHD ef-
fects (issue No. 11 ). 
- ldentify schemes to separate the Al containing insulation coating from the struc-
ture to reduce the long term waste (issue No. 16). 
- Invcstigate the gamma activation of Pb-17Li for operational safety and develop 
means to cope with the gamma activation during maintenance and repair (issue 
No. 17). 
- Refine models and verify tritium control in the first wall belium coolant (perme-
ation through the first wall from tbe plasma) including tritium Iosses through 
the steam generator tube walls, i.e., permeation barricr effectivencss, durability, 
lcakage (issue No. 21). 
lnvestigate the tritium permeation from tbe NaK system in the 
Pb-17Li/NaK/water steam generators including permcation barrier effectiveness 
on the water side (issue No. 21). 
6.2.5 Additional activities for the WC concept 
- Analyses of dcpressurisation processes, i.e., pressure and tcmperature transients 
in containment compartments (vacuum vessel, cryostat, loop compartments), re-
quircd expansion volumcs and relief devices, including pressure suppression sys-
tems (issues No. 1 and 4). 
- Study Pb-17Li/water reactions inside the blanket, potential for darnage propa-
gation, pressurisation of blanket box, pressure pulses, cffectivencss of pressurc 
relief devices, response timcs (issuc No. 2). 
- Study the build-up of activation products in Pb-17Li with consideration of rcal-
istic in-corejex-core accident sequences and operational cycles. Develop tech-
niqucs for on-line removal of activation products like Hg, Bi, Po (issuc No. 6). 
- Develop means for on-line removal of corrosion and sputter products from pri-
mary water coolant (issue No. 6). 
- Study the natural convection capability of the first wall water cooling including 
the transition from forced flow to natural convection flow with consideration of 
two-phase flow and perhaps steam binding in some coolant channels (issue No. 
1 0). 
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- Study the natural convection capability of the breeding zone water cooling in-
cluding the transition from forced flow to natural convection flow with possible 
flow reversal (issue No. 11). 
- Study the effect of fabrication tolerances, modelling uncertainties, and partial 
plugging on flow maldistribution in parallel coolant channels with view to tem-
perature control in structure, liquid breeder (issues No. 14 and 15). 
- lnspect the gamma-dose rate (N-16) of the water coolant and its consequences 
on shielding requirements around pipes and components (issue No. 17). 
- lnvestigate the gamma activation of Pb-l7Li for operational safety and develop 
means to cope with the gamma activation during maintenance and repair (issue 
No. 17). 
- Verify tritium control in thc primary cooling water at high tritium loading rates 
and high water through-puts, study tritium release paths in normal operation, 
i.e., leakage from cooling circuits and in the steam generator. 
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Table 7. Safety issues ratings and weighted safety issues ratings 
Issue Issues Ratings (R;J) Weighted Issues Ratings 
No. F; 
Ri,BIT R;,nor R;,oc R;,wc F;R;,BIT F;R;,nor F;R;,DC F;R;,wc 
1 10 -2 -2 -1 -1 -20 -20 -10 -10 
2 10 -0,2 -0,4 -1 -2 -2 -4 -10 -20 
3 5 -0,7 -0,15 -0,1 -0,2 -3,5 -0,75 -0,5 -1 
4 6 -1,5 -1,6 -0,5 -0,6 -9 -9,6 -3 -3,6 
5 8 -I -1 -0,3 -0,3 -8 -8 -2,4 -2,4 
6 8 -0,3 -0,3 -0,8 -0,8 -2,4 -2,4 -6,4 -6,4 
7 6 -0,8 -0,8 -0,2 -0,2 -4,8 -4,8 -1,2 -1,2 
8 6 -0,5 -0,5 -1 -1 -3 -3 -6 -6 
9 5 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -5 0 
10 6 -1 -1 -1 -0,2 -6 -6 -6 -1,2 
11 6 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -3 -3 -3 -3 
12 6 -1 -1 -1,5 -1,5 -6 -6 -9 -9 
13 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 8 -0,25 -0,25 -0,25 -0,5 -2 -2 -2 -4 
15 5 0 -0,75 -0,5 -0,7 0 -3,75 -2,5 -3,5 
16 6 -1,5 -1,5 -1 -1 -9 -9 -6 -6 
17 4 -0,3 -0,3 -0,8 -0,6 -1,2 -1,2 -3,2 -2,4 
18 6 -1 -1 -1 -1 -6 -6 -6 -6 
19 8 -1,1 -1 -1,6 
-1' l -8,8 -8 -12,8 -8,8 
20 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -5 -5 -5 -5 
22 4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -4 -4 -4 
23 8 -0,8 -1 -2 -2 -6,4 -8 -16 -16 
Overall Safety Rating (OSR) -110,1 -114,5 -120 -119,5 
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Table 8. The big penalty points 
BIT vs. BOT (Score > 2 points per issue) 
BIT BOT 
• Issue 3: Frequency of LOCA due • Issue 2: Minimise the amount of 
to disruption (score -2.75 points) chemically reactive materials (score 
-2 points) 
• Issue 15: Risk for plugging of BZ 
coolant flow (scorc -3.75 points) 
DC vs. WC (Score > 2 points per issue) 
DC wc 
• Issue 9: Events due to failure inside • Issue 2: Amount of chemically re-
steam generator (score -5 points) active material (score -10 points) 
• Issue 10: Natural convection of • Issue 14: Risk for plugging and lo-
FW primary coolant (score -4.8 cal flow red uction of the first wall 
points) primary coolant (score -2 points) 
• Issuc 19: Extend weil established 
technology (score -4 points) 
BIT, BOT vs. DC, 'VC (Average score > 3 points per issue) 
BIT, BOT DC, WC 
• Issue 1: Fluids internal encrgy • Issue 2: Amount of chemicaJJy re-
(score -10 points) active material (score -6 to -18 
• Issue 4: Mechanical energy relcase points) 
from primary coolant (score -5.4 to • Issue 6: Activation products in flu-
- 6.6 points) id blanket materials (score -4 
• Issue 5: Activation products in sol- points) 
id blanket materials (score -5.6 • Issue 23: Release of activation pro-
points) ducts in case of DBAs (score -8 to 
• Issue 7: Minimise the tritium in- -9.6 points) 
ventory in solid blanket materials 
(score -3.6 points) 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
In the frame of the blanket concept selection exercise the working group 6a ( one of 
a total of 14 working groups) assesscd the safety implications of the four European 
blanket concepts. 23 safety issues have been identified and the four concepts were 
evaluatcd against each issuc, applying a methodology proposed for all working 
groups. Part of the issues could only be assessed qualitatively based on engineering 
judgement, implying subjective influences and, hence, !arge uncertainties in the indi-
vidual ratings. These tend to bc mitigated by finding consensus among experts and 
by the summation to yield the overall ratings. 
In view of the remaining unccrtainties, the small differences in the overall ratings 
for the four blanket concepts (Table 6 on page 45) do not allow to apply a ranking 
with respcct to safety. This is particularly true when comparing the two liquid meta! 
blankets or the two solid brceder blankets. For thosc couples the differences are 
marginal. In the contest of the solid breeder blankets against the liquid brceder 
blankets, a small advantagc in favour of the solid breeder blankets has been re-
ported, mainly due to the !arger amount and mobility of radioactive material in the 
liquid breeder blankets. These, howevcr, depend on engineering safeguards and as-
sumcd accident seenarios which are undefined at present. 
In summary, safety does not deliver dccisive arguments in favour of, or against, any 
of the four European blanket conccpts. Nevertheless, the normaliscd overall safety 
ratings (0.638 for BIT, 0.623 for BOT, 0.605 for DC and 0.607 for WC) should be 
used as part of the final rating involving the results from all working groups. All 
concepts cause a number of safcty concerns requiring further R&D activities in dif-
ferent fields. Some of them arc common to all conccpts (like extreme disruptions, 
low activation material, tritium implantation in first wall, different accident scenar-
ios), othcrs are more specific as outlined in 6.2 on page 46 and in Table 9 on 
page 54. 
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Table 9. Future developments in blanket safety 
Common to all Concepts 
- Extreme disruptions 
- Low actlvation material 
- Tritium implantation in FW 
- LOCA, LOFA temperature transients 
- LOHS transients 
- Source tcrm generation 
BIT BOT 
- LOCA pressure transients - LOCA pressure transients 
- Be chemical reactions - Be chemical reactions 
- Impurities in Be - Impurities in Be 
- Sputter products in He - Sputter products in He 
- Tritium release from Be - Tritium release from Be 
- Natural convection in He - Natural convection in He 
- Recycling Be and breeder - Flow maldistribution 
- Tritium control in He - Recycling Be and breeder 
- Tritium Iosses in SG - Tritium control in He 
- Tritium Iosses in SO 
DC wc 
- NaKjwater reactions - LOCA pressure transients 
- AP in Pb-17Li - Pb-17Lijwater reactions 
- Sputter products in He - AP in Pb-l7Li 
- Natural convection in He - Sputter products in water 
- Natural convection Pb-l7Li - Natural convection in water 
- Al coating separation - Flow maldistribution 
- Gamma activation of Pb-l7Li - Gamma-dose rate of water 
- Tritium control in He - Gamma activation of Pb-l7Li 
- Tritium Iosses in He SGs - Tritium control in water 
- Tritium Iosses in LM SGs 
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9. Abbreviations 
AP 
BCG 
BCSE 
BDBA 
BIT 
BOL 
BOT 
BZ 
cc 
DBA 
DC 
DEMO 
EOL 
EU 
FW 
ITER 
LM 
LOCA 
LOFA 
MHD 
OSR 
osr 
PIE 
PCS 
SG 
TAG 
tbd 
vv 
wc 
WG 
activation products 
blanket co-ordination group 
blanket concept selection exercise 
beyond design basis accident 
breeder inside tube blanket concept 
bcgin of life 
brecder outside tube blankct conccpt 
brccding zone 
cooling circuit 
design basis accident 
dual coolant blankct concept 
demonstration rcactor 
end of life 
European Union 
first wall 
international thcrmonuclear experimental reactor 
liquid meta! 
loss of coolant accident 
loss of flow accidcnt 
magneto-hydrodynamics 
overall safety ra ting 
normalised overall safety rating 
primary initiating event 
primary cooling system 
steam gcnerator 
test blanket advisory group 
to be detcrmined 
vacu um vessel 
water-cooled blanket concept 
working grou p 
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Appendix A. Design and Safety Objectives for the DEMO 
Blankets and Associated Cooling Systems 
Thc identification of the safety issues to be evaluated in WG6a is based on the de-
fence-in-depth strategy which is a widely accepted methodology in fission and fu-
sion technology. As a suitable cxample the exercise performed in [7] is adopted to 
iqentify, in a comprehensive way, the design and safety concerns (or objectives) im-
posed by thc four DEMO blankct concepts and rclatcd cooling systems. This list of 
design and safety objectives is given below, rendering a total of approximately 135 
issues. Many of the issues listed in Table 10 (about 20) nccd to be assessed by 
other WGs and the majority of the remaining issues nceds to be addressed in a later 
stage (labelled 'beyond BCSE') as the plant design advances. 23 issues have been 
selected for treatment by the safety group which are meant to be generic, inherent, 
and decisive to the blanket concepts. These 23 issues are Iabelied 'lssue No.' in the 
sequence of their appearance. 
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Table 10 (Page 1 of 5). Design and safety objectives for the DEM 0 blanket 
and associated systems 
Design and safety objectivcs, bascd on the defence-in-depth strategy 
Ist Level: PREVENTION (eonservative design, quality assurance, safety culture) 
1.1 Satisfy the design rules 
• Elaborate a design consistent with all plausible situations 
=> Ensure an adequate system performance: 
remove high heat flux (efficiency, reliability) 
=> Ensure an adequate system performance: 
pulsed operation behaviour 
=> Integrate short term unique failure for active and passive systems 
1.2 Minimise the frequency for abnormal situations (Initiators): 
• Sequences initiated by extreme disruption 
• Scquences initiated by tokamak related phenomena 
• Sequences initiated by a leakage in primary coolant (LOCA) 
=> Minimise the fluids internal energy (system pressure) 
=> Minimise the corrosion potential among fluids and envelop 
• Sequences initiated by lass of primary coolant flow (LOFA) 
=> Minimise the number of valves 
=> Minimise the MHD effects 
• Sequences initiated by lass of secondary coolant 
• Sequences initiated by loss of heat sink 
• Sequences related to lass of vacuum 
• Sequences initiated by malfunction in magnetic systems 
• Sequences initiated by fault in the electrical power supply 
or auxiliary systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the tritium plant 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the fuel management systems 
• Sequences originating from events in the radioactive storage areas 
• Analysis of events during spccial plant conditions 
• Transport safety 
• Sequences iniiiated by internal abnormal environment 
1.3 Minimise the potential for common modcs (Initiators) 
• Minimise the potential for üres 
=> Minimise the amount of chernically reactive material 
• Separate and diversify the systems 
=> Separate the heat removal (HR) function from others 
=> Separate the normal and safeguards HR systems 
=> Separate the HR flies 
=> Diversify the systems components 
1.4 Minimise the inhcrcnt potential conscqucnces for the PIE 
• Scquences initiated by tokamak related phenomena 
=> Minimise the frequency of occurrence due to extreme disruptions 
• Sequences initiated by a leakage in prirnary coolant (LOCA) 
=> Minimise mechanical energy upon flushing of primary coolant 
=> Minimise the activation products in solid blanket materials 
=> Minimise the activation products in fluid blanket materials 
=> Minimise the tritium inventory in solid blanket materials 
=> Minimise the tritium inventory in fluid blanket materials 
• Sequences initiated by loss of prirnary coolant flow (LOFA) 
=> _p_rmride numo inertia 
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Comments 
WGI 
WGl 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
WGl 
Issue No. 1 
WG4 
bcyond BCSE 
WG7 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
Issue No. 2 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
Jssue No. 3 
Jssue No. 4 
Issue No. 5 
Issue No. 6 
Issue No. 7 
Issue No. 8 
WG4 
Table 10 (Page 2 of 5). Design and safety objectives for the DEMO blanket 
and associated systems 
De.'iign and safcty objcctivcs, bascd on the defencc-in-depth strategy 
• Sequences initiated by loss of secondary coolant 
~ Minimise the consequenccs of events initiated by failure in SGs 
• Sequences initiated by loss of heat sink 
~ Design for loss of heat sink 
• Sequences related to loss of vacuum 
• Scquences initiated by malfunction in magnetic systems 
~ Minimise the consequenccs initiated by faults in the 
magnetic system 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the electrical power supply system 
or auxiliary systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the tritium plant 
~ Minimise the tritium invcntory in thc tritium extraction plant 
~ Implement tritium removal 
• Scquences initiated by faults in the fuel management systems 
• Sequences originating from cvents in the radioactive storage areas 
• Analysis of events during special plant conditions 
• Transport safety 
• Sequences initiated by internal abnormal environment 
• Separate and diversify the systems 
~ Separate the heat removal (HR) function from the others 
~ Separate the normal and safcguards HR systems 
~ Separate the HR ftles 
• Integrate inherent characteristics 
~ Design for natural convection of flrst wall prirnary coolant 
~ Design for natural convection of breeder/multiplier primary 
coolant 
~ Ensure adequate thermal inertia 
~ Reduce the potential for chemical reactions leading 
to hydrogen production 
1.5 Elaborate a simplified design 
• Elaborate a simplified thermal-hydraulic design 
~ Implement coolants which are fluid at room tempcrature 
~ Elaborate a simplifled HR systems architecture 
~ Minimise induced effects (e.g. MHD) 
~ Minimise the risk for plugging of the first wall primary coolant 
flow 
~ Minimise the risk for plugging of the breedcr/multiplier coolant 
flow 
• Elaborate a simplifled thermodynamic design 
~ Limit the nurober of brauch connections 
~ Limit the transients impact 
~ Limit the nurober of components per circuit 
~ Provide low pressure scrvice 
1.6 Simplify reactor Operations and maintenance proccdures 
• Ensure an adequate quality of information (operation data) 
~ Implement adequate instrumentation for operating conditions 
• Sirnolifv and automate the nroct -1. ~s 
Commcnts 
Issue No. 9 
see Issue No. 22 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
WG3 
WG3 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
Issue No. 10 
Issue No. 11 
Issue No. 12 
Issue No. 13 
WGl,WG4 
WG4 
WGl, WG7 
Issue No. 14 
lssue No. 15 
WG4 
WG4 
WG4 
sec Issue No. 1 
beyond BCSE 
hP.vnnc1 Ht:SR 
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Table 10 (Page 3 of 5). Design and safety objectives for the DEMO blanket 
and associated systems 
Design and safety objectives, bascd on the defence-in-dcpth strategy 
1.7 Minimise radioactive waste 
• Simplify the chemistry of thc components 
=> Provide chemically and physically stable materials 
=> Minimise the incompatibility among components (potential for 
corrosion) 
=> Minimise the risk for contact among incompatible components 
• Reduce the self-generation of radioactive waste 
=> Reduce activation of structural materials 
=> Reduce the long term waste 
• Ensure the good materials bchaviour under irradiation 
=> Implement irradiation resistant materials 
1.8 Minimise personnet exposure 
• Minimise the contact dose 
=> Minimise the contact dose of heat transpurt systems 
=> Limit length and complexity of circuits carrying activated fluid 
• Minimise the maintenance times 
=> Provide easy dismantling and access (contact maintenance) 
2nd Level: CONTROL (control of abnormal operations and detection of failures) 
2.1 Detect the primary initiating event (PIE) 
• Sequences initiated by tokamak related phenomena 
• Sequences initiated by a leakage in prirnary coolant LOCA) 
• Sequences initiated by loss of prirnary coolant flow (LOPA) 
• Sequences initiated by loss of secondary coolant 
• Sequences initiated by loss of heat sink 
• Sequences related to loss of vacuum 
• Sequences initiated by malfunction in magnetic systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the electrical power supply 
or auxiliary systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the tritium plant 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the fuel management systems 
• Sequences originating from events in the radioactive storage areas 
• Analysis of events during special plant conditions 
• Transport safety 
• Sequences initiated by internal abnormal environment 
2.2 Elaborate a forgiving design 
• Take into account the unavailability for maintenance 
=> Foresee an internal redundancy to take 
unavailabilities into account 
=> Ensure common operation range for complementary systems 
• Ensure appropriate physical margins 
=> Provide !arge range before structure melting 
• Dnsure appropriate grace period 
=> Ensure an adequate internal system inertia 
=> Ensure the access, in a passive way, to an 
adeauate extemaline1tia 
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Comments 
WGl, 8, 9, 10 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
see point 1.4 
Issue No. 16 
WG1 
Issue No. 17 
lssue No. 18 
WGS 
beyund BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyund BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
WG4 
WG4 
WGl 
covered in 1.4 
beyond BCSE 
Table 10 (Page 4 of 5). Design and safety objectives for the DEM 0 blanket 
and associated systems 
Design and safety objcctivcs, bascd on thc dcfence-in-depth stratcgy 
2.3 Minimise the uncertaintics 
• Implement qualified materials 
~ Extend well establishcd technology 
~ Standardisc componcnts bctween operational and 
safeguard systems 
~ Poresee the possibility for representative maintenance tcsts 
~ Provide for redundancy of cooling systems 
2.4 Minimise incidental personnet exposure 
• Strengtben the flrst barrier 
2.5 Minimise incidcntal radioactive waste 
• Strengtben the frrst barrier 
~ Elaborate an architecture for the circuits permanently 
connected to the prirnary system 
~ Elaborate an architecturc for the circuits tcmporarily 
connected to the primary system 
• Strengtben the second barrier 
~ Elaborate a design for the circuits connectcd to the 
secondary system 
o Strengtheu the third barricr 
3rd Level: J>ROTECTION (Safcty systems and protection systcms) 
3.1 Simplify the inherent accidental plant behaviour for the J>JE 
• Sequences initiated by tokamak related phenomena 
• Sequences initiated by a leakagc in primary coolant .LOCA) 
~ Provide inherent shutdown 
• Sequences initiated by loss of primary coolant flow (LOFA) 
~ Provide inhcrent shutdown 
• Scquences initiated by loss of secondary coolant 
• Sequences initiated by loss of heat sink 
• Sequences relatcd to loss of vacuum 
• Scquences initiated by malfunction in magnetic systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the electrical power supply 
or auxiliary systems 
• Sequences initiated by faults in thc tritium plant 
• Sequences initiated by faults in the fuel management systcms 
• Scquences originating from cvents in the radioactive storage areas 
• Analysis of events during spccial plant conditions 
• Transport safety 
• Sequences initiated by intcrnal abnormal environment 
3.2 Simplify the accidental intervcntion proccdures 
• Ensure an adequate information (abnormal situations) 
~ Implement adequatc instrumentation 
(abnormal operating conditions) 
• Ensure and simplify the reparability 
~ Sirnplify the cleanup of VV surface after an internal LOCA 
o Ensure the oro2:ression of the defence-in-deoth 
Comments 
Issue No. 19 
WGI 
WGS 
Issue No. 20 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
bcyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
WGS 
bevond BCSE 
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Table l 0 (Page 5 of 5). Design and safety objectives for the DEM 0 blanket 
and associated systems 
Design and safety objcctivcs, bascd on the dcfcnce-in-depth strategy 
3.3 Minimise the potential for common modes (intemal or extemal hazards) 
• Separate and diversify the safcty systems 
~ Separate the HR safcguard ftle 
3.4 Minimise the uncertainties 
• Elaborate a design that simplifies the incidental seenarios 
• Implement an adequate instrumentation 
3.5 Reduce the risk (frequency) vcrsus the accidents 
whose conscqucnces arc not allowed 
• Take into account the loss of redundant systems 
( complementary situations) 
~ Implement functional redundancy 
• Take into account intemal and cxternal hazards (ftres, floods, etc.) 
~ Ensure a reliable backup cold source qualifted to the 
external hazards 
• Take into account major accidents 
~ Implement adequate instrumentation (severe 
accident conditions) 
~ Envisage the I IR for sevcre accident conditions 
=> Protect the material (e.g. instrumentation) against 
potential hazards 
4th Level: SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT (confinement protection) 
4. J Minimise the uncertaintics 
• Elaborate a design that simpliftes the inherent accident seenarios 
~ Design ultimate IIR passive systcm inside the containment 
• Implement an adcquate instrumentation 
4.2 Rejcct, by design, the cliff edge cffects 
• Strengtheu the third barrier 
• Prevent !arge containment leakage 
• Prevcnt the risk for detonation (I-f2) 
~ Implement hydrogen rnitigation features 
• Prevent the containment bypass 
5th Level: CONSEQUENCES MITIGA TION ( off-site emergency response) 
5.1 Delay the off-site rclcase 
5.2 Minimise the off-site radioactive release 
• Minimise the release during normal operation 
~ Minimise the tritium permeation to steam systems 
• Millimise the release during abnormal situations 
• Minimise the release during accidents 
~ In case of loss of heat sink 
~ In case of dcsign basis accidents (DBA) 
~ In case of bcyond design basis accidcnts (BDBA) 
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Comments 
beyond BCSE 
covered elsewhere 
bcyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
bcyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
beyond BCSE 
Issue No. 21 
beyond BCSE 
Issue No. 22 
Jssue No. 23 
bcyond BCSE 
Appendix B. DEMO Blanket Concepts Data Sheets and 
Drawings 
This appendix contains a list of items for which data have been collected for the 
four Europcan DEMO blanket concepts to be used in the blanket comparison and 
selcction exercise (BCSE) in Working Group 6a. The data provide the basis for the 
safety cvaluation process. Most of the data have been taken from the compact re-
ports [1], [2], [3], [4], some of them have been provided by the WG6a members 
from the originalliterature. The items are grouped into the following 11 categories: 
1. First wall cooling system 
2. Breeder/multiplier cooling system 
3. Liquid brcedcr circuit systern 
4. NaK system for tritium removal 
5. Purge gas system 
6. Solid materials inventory 
7. Peak nominal operating temperatures in solids 
8. Tritium inventory (aftcr 20000 h) 
9. Power production during normal operation (after 20000 h) 
10. Specific activity at several decay times 
11. Afterheat production at several decay times 
The following abbreviations are used in Table 11 on page 66. 
ib inboard 
ob outboard 
na not applicable 
no data available 
I separator between items 
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Table 11 (Page 1 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT BOT DC 
1. First wall cooling system 
• Type of coolant heliuro heliuro heliuro 
• Nurober of loops ib/ob/total 2/2/2 6/12/18 4/6/10 
• Number of loops connected to one segment ib/ob 2/2 6/12 4/6 
• Typical pipe dimensions (ro) 
- Irrboard hot leg id/wall thickness/length 1.88°/-/- 1.08/0.07/45" 0.8/0.05/40 
- Irrboard cold leg id/wall thickness/length - - 0.72/-/20 
- Irrboard feeders id/wall thickness/length 0.174/-/- 0.289/0.0175/ 15c 0.13/0.01/20 
- Outboard hat leg id/wall thickness/length 1.88a /0.025/- 1.08/0.07/45 0. 76/0.05/40 
- Outboard cold leg id(wall thickness/length - - 0.7/-/20 
- Outboard feeders id/wall thickness/length 0.23°/0.04/- 0.289/0.0175/12 0.15/0.01/20 
- Total nurober of feeders ibjob 128/192 128/192 128/192 
• Nominalpressure ib/ob (MPa) 6.5/6.5 8/8 8/8 
• Operating teroperature (0 C) 
- inboard inlet/outlet 280/350 250/300 250/350 
- outboard inletjoutlet 280/350 250/300 250/350 
• Mass flow rate per segment ib/ob (kg/s) 14/25.5 20.4/36.5 11.1/13.3 
• Mass coo1ant inventory (kg) 
- Single inboard loop blanket/piping/components 48.8hj-j- 45/1130/205 45/414/150 
- Total inboard loops blanket/piping/coroponents 97.6/-/- 270/6780/1230 180/1656/600 
- Single outboard 1oop blanket/piping/coroponents included in ib 42/892/214 148/357/150 
- Totaloutboard loops blanket/pipingjcoroponents included in ib 505/10700/2570 888/2142/900 
- Escaping into VV upon single failure froro ib/ob - 4100/6900 1219/1970 
Note: 
a. Estimates based on given flow rates and a helium velocity of 60 ro/s. 
b. Estimate based on given values for one ib segment (1.1 kg) and one ob segment (1.3 kg), i.e., =0.5(l.lx32+ 1.3x48). 
c. V alues for ib assumed to be equal to the ones for ob. 
d. Each one connecting 24 ob and 16 ib first wall boxes. 
e. Includes piping plus coroponents. 
f. Assuming that the two loops are not connected. 
---- --- --- ----
wc 
pressurised H20 
2/2f2d 
1/1 
0.542/-/-
0.522/-/-
-
0.542/-/-
0.522/-/-
-
64/96 
15.5/15.5 
305/325 
305/325 
43.5/66.9 
6000/27000• 
12000/54000· 
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included in ib 
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Table 11 (Page 2 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT BOT I DC I 
I 
2. Breeder/multiplier cooling system I 
• Type of coolant heliuro helium na 
• Nurober of loops ibjob/total 2!2/2 6/12/18 na 
• Nurober of loops connected to one segment ib/ob 2/2 6/12 na 
• Typical pipe dimensions (ro) 
- Inboard hat leg idjwall thickness/length 2.2/-/- 1.08/0.07 j45c na 
- Inboard cold leg id/wall thickness/length - - na 
- Inboard feeders id/wall thickness/length 0.183°/-/- 0.289j0.0175j15c na 
- Outboard hat leg idjwall thickness/length 2.2°/0.03/- 1.08/0.07/45" na 
- Outboard cold leg id/wall thicknessjlength - - na 
- Outboard feeders idjwall thickness/length 0.28•/0.05/- 0.289/0.0 175/12c na 
- Total nurober offeeders ib/ob 128/192 128/192 na 
• Nominal pressure ib/ob (MPa) 5/5 8/8 na 
• Operating teroperature CO C) 
- inboard inletjoutlet 250/500 300/450 na 
- outboard inlet/outlet 250/500 300/450 na 
• Mass flow rate per segment ib/ob (kg/s) 12/21.5 see FWc na 
• Mass coolant inventory (kg) 
- Single inboard loop blanket/piping/coroponents 9.9"/-/- incl. in FWc na 
- Total inboard loops blanket/piping/coroponents 19.8/-/- incl. in FWc na 
- Singleoutboard loop blanket/piping/coroponents included in ib incl. in FWc na 
- Totaloutboard loops blanket/piping/coroponents included in ib incl. in FWc na 
- escaping into VV upon single failure froro ib/ob - same as FWc na 
Note: 
a. Estimates based on given flow rates and a heliuro velocity of 60 ro/s . 
b. Estimate based on given values for one ib segment (0.17 kg) and one ob segment (0.3 kg), i.e., = 0.5(0.17x32 + 0.3x48). 
c. V alues are identical to those in the first wall cooling system since both are in series . 
d. Each one connecting 12 ob and 8 ib breeding zones. 
e. Includes inventory in piping plus coroponents. 
f. Assuming that the two loops are not connected. 
wc 
pressurised H20 
4f4f4d 
1/1 
0.405/-/-
0.372/-/-
-
0.405/-/-
0.372/-/-
0.102/0.007/-
64/96 
15.5/15.5 
265/325 
265/325 
36.3/76.3 
5000 /14000• 
20000 /56000• 
included in ib 
included in ib 
19000 /1900()f 
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Table 11 (Page 3 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT BOT DC 
3. Liquid Breeder System 
• Type of liquid breeder na na Pb-17Li 
• Nurober of loops ib/ob/total na na 4/6/10 
• Number of loops connected to one segment ib/ob na na 4/3 
• Typical pipe dimensions (m) 
- Irrboard hat leg id/wall thickness/length na na 0.83/0.03/40 
- Irrboard feeders id/wall thickness/length na na 0.25/0.01/15 
- Outboard hat leg id/wall thickness/length na na 1.15/0.04/40 
- Outboard feeders id/wall thickness/length na na 0.33/0.02/12 
- Total number of feeders ib/ob na na 64/96 
• Nominalpressure ib/ob (MPa) na na 2/2 
• Operating temperature C C) 
- inboard inletjoutlet na na 275/425 
- outboard inlet/outlet na na 275/425 
• Mass flow rate per segment ib/ob (kg/s) na na 484/814 
• Mass liquid breeder inventory (103 kg) 
- Single inboard loop blanket/piping/components na na 218/619/188 
- Total inboard loops blanket/piping/components na na 872/2476/752 
- Singleoutboard loop b1anket/piping/components na na 517/951/327 
- Totaloutboard loops blanketjpiping/components na na 3102/5706/ 1962 
- Escaping into VV upon single failure from ib/ob na na 1500/2000 
Note: 
a. Each one connecting 12 ob and 8 ib breeding zones. 
b. Includes inventory in piping plus components. 
c. Assuming that the inventory from one loop outside the segments be drained and that the loops are not interconnected. 
wc 
Pb-17Li 
4/4(4• 
1/l 
-
-
-
0.23/0.0075/-
-
1.5/1.5 
265/325 
265/325 
4.0/8.5 
1000/ lOO()b 
4000(400()b 
included in ib 
included in ib 
1000/lOOOc 
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Table 11 (Page 4 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
4. NaK System for Tritium Removal 
• Type of intermediate coolant na 
• Number of loops ib/ob/total na 
• Typical pipe dimensions (m) 
- Inboard system hot leg id/wall thickness/length na 
- Outboard system hot leg id/wall thickness/length na 
• Nominal pressure ib/ob (MPa) na 
• Operating temperature (0 C) 
- inboard system inlet/outlet at steam generator na 
- outboard system inletfoutlet at steam generator na 
• Mass flow rate per loop ib/ob (kg/s) na 
• Mass inventory (kg) 
- Single inboard loop na 
- Total inboard loops na 
- Single outboard loop na 
- Totaloutboard loops na 
- Escaping into containment upon single failure na 
from ib/ob 
BOT DC wc 
na NaK na 
na 4/6/10 na 
na 0.10/0.004/200 na 
na 0.15/0.005/200 na 
na < 1/ < 1 na 
na 260/360 na 
na 260/360 na 
na 18.5/37 na 
na 2560 na 
na 10240 na 
na 5130 na 
na 30800 na 
na 1300/2600 na 
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Table 11 (Page 5 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
5. Purge Gas System 
• Type of purge gas helium 
• Nurober of loops ibjob 1 common loop 
• Number of loops connected to one segment ibjob 1/1 
• Typical pipe dimensions (m) 
- Irrboard main pipe id/wall thickness/length -
- Irrboard feeders id/wall thickness/1ength -
- Outboard main pipe id/wall thickness/1ength 0.7/0.01/-
- Outboard feeders id/wall thickness/1ength -1-1-
- Total nurober offeeders ib/ob 64/96 
• Nominal pressure ibjob (MPa) 4.7/4.7 
• Operating temperature (0 C) 
- inboard inlet/outlet 200/500 
- outboard inlet/out1et 200/500 
• Mass flow rate per segment ib/ob (kgjs) 0.1/0.1 
• Mass purge gas inventory (kg) 
- Total inboard 1oops b1anket/pipingjcomponents 14/-/-
- Totaloutboard loops blanket/pipingjcomponents 9/-/-
Note: 
a. Based on own estimates 
b. Piping and components in common with ib. 
L_ _____ 
BOT DC wc 
heliuro na na 
1 common loop na na 
1/1 na na 
~0.4j0.02j95a na na 
~o.45j0.005fl2a na na 
same as ib na na 
same as ib na na 
64/96 na na 
0.13/0.13 na na 
20/625 na na 
20/625 na na 
0.006/0.013 na na 
l.7j2.8j2.8a na na 
4.4/incl. in i!Jb na na 
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Table 11 (Page 6 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
6. Solid Materials Inventory (1()3 kg) 
• Structural material 
- first wallregiontotal ib/ob 410 (ib + ob)a 
- breeding regiontotal ib/ob included in FW 
- shie1d region (removab1e) total ib/ob -
- insu1ating 1ayers total ib/ob/total -
- total structural material ib I ob . 
• Solidbreeder 
-type ofbreeder/e:ffective density (kgfnil) LiAl021 1700 
- mass inventory total ib/ob (103 kg) 112(ib+ob) 
• Solid mu1tiplier 
- type of multiplier/effective density (kgfnil) Be (pellets)/1670 
- Mass inventory total ib/ob/total (103 kg) -/-/532 
7. Peak Nominal Operating Temperatures in Solids (0 C) 
• Structural material 
- first wall ib/ob 400/400 
- breeding zone ib/ob 530/530 
• Solid breeder ib/ob 589/547 
• Multiplier (beryllium) ib/ob 450/450 
Note: 
a. lncludes the structural material in the breeding zone (ib + ob) 
b. Basedon estimates assuming an Al1ayer thickness of 10-5 m. 
c. Based on estimates assuming an Al1ayer thickness of 2 X 1 o-s m. 
--- -·- -
BOT DC wc 
I 
I 
44/69 39/58 44/69 
189/408 454/793 212/953 
862/676 758/1020 272/816 
0/0/0 0.08/0.28/0 .. 3& ·/-/0.68c 
1095/1153 1250/1870 528/1838 
L4Si04/ 1490 na na 
23.3/51.7 I na na 
Be (pebb1es)/ 1450 na na 
93/206/299 na na 
520/520 490/490 480/500 
450/450 450/450 457/504 
900/900 na na 
-/640 BOL, na na 
500 EOL 
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Table 11 (Page 7 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
8. Tritium Inventory (after 20000 h) 
• in structural material (g) 
- first wall total 3- 300a 
- breeding region total -
- manifo1d and shie1d region total -
- total ib/ob segments -
• in solid breeder (g) 
- breeding regiontotal ib/ob 100 
• in multiplier (g) 
- breeding region total 400- 340()6 
• in fluids (g) 
- total liquid breeder ib I ob na 
- total :first wall coo1ant ib/ob -
- total breeder/multiplier coo1ant ib/ob -
- total NaK circuits ibjob na 
- total purge gas 0.01 
• in tritium recovery system (g) 
- total ex:traction units -
- maximum per unit -
Note: 
a. According to [1]; uncertainties from tritium imp1antation from the plasma. 
b. According to [1]; uncertainties in the assessment. 
c. FISP ACT results; numbers do not include the tritium imp1anted from the plasma. 
BOT DC wc 
5.5" 2.6c -
5.3 1.8 -
1.3 0.006 -
3.1/9.0 4.4 (total) 3/7 
3/7 na na 
1278 na na 
na 16/41 7/13 
0.17/0.3 < 2.4/ < 3.9 4.9 (ib+ob) 
included in FW na 8.2 (ib+ob) 
na 0.1/0.3 na 
0.08 na na 
300 100 ca. 1 
100 15 -
- -- - - -------------------------···· --
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Table 11 (Page 8 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
9. Power Production in Normal Operation (after 20000 h) 
• in structural material ( Wf cnil) 
- fust wall region midplane average ibjob -
- fust wall region total average ibjob -
- breeding region midplane average ib/ob -
- breeding regiontotal average ib/ob -
- shield region midplane average ib/ob -
- shield region total average ib I ob -
• In solidbreedermaterial (Wfcnil) 
- in breeding region midplane average ib/ob -
- in breeding regiontotal average ib/ob -
• In solid multiplier (Wfcm') 
- in breeding region midplane average ib/ob -
- in breeding regiontotal average ib/ob -
• In liquid breeder (Wfcm') 
- in breeding region midplane average ib/ob -
- in breeding region total average ib/ob -
10. Specific Activity after 0 s, 1 d, 1 y, 10 y, 500 y 
• in structural material (Bq/kg) 
- fust wall region midplane average ib/ob 
~ after 0 s -
~ after 1 d -
~ after 1 y -
~ after 10 y -
~ after 500 v -
BOT DC wc 
18.5/24.7 16.0/21.9 -
15.4/20.6 13.4/18.4 -
6.14/8.18 1.3/1.7 -
5.12/6.82 1.1/1.5 -
5.03/6.71 0.15/0.2 -
4.19/5.59 0.15/0.2 -
13.8/18.4 na na 
11.5/15.3 na na 
3.68/4.90 na na 
3.06/4.08 na na 
na 3.0/4.0 -
na 2.6/3.5 -
6.2e 14/7.le 14 5.8el4/6.6el4 6.0el4/ l.Oel5 
3.5e14/4.0el4 3.6e14/4.0el4 6.0el4/ l.Oe15 
2.0e14/2.3el4 2.le14/2.3el4 2.5e14/5.0e14 
1.8e13/2.0e 13 L8e 13/2.le 13 2.0el3/5.0e13 
2.9e09/3.2e09 2.7e09/3.0e09 1.0e09/S.Oe09 
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Table 11 (Page 9 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
- fust wall regi.on total average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- breeding regi.on midplane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- breeding regi.on total average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- shie1d regi.on midplane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- shield regi.on total average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 v -
BOT DC wc 
2.9e14/3.3el4 2.4e14/4.5e14 5.3e14/8.5e14 
l.5e14/ l.8e 14 L5el4/2.7el4 4.5e14/8.5el4 
8.5el3/l.Oe14 8.5el3/1.6e14 2.3el4/4.5e14 
7 .6e 12/8.9e 12 3.8el2/L4el3 2.0e13/4.5el3 I 
L5e09/L6e09 1.3e09 /2.2e09 3.0e09/4.0e09 I 
2.3el4/1.9e14 4.0el3/4.2e 13 -
l.Oel4/8.3el3 1.8e 13/2.5e 13 -
5.3el3/4.3e14 8.6el2/1.4el3 -
4.7el2/3.8e12 8.lell/1.2e12 -
1.3e09/9.9e08 5.0e08/6.4e08 -
9.8el3/7.5el3 1.6el3/2.8el3 -
4.0e l3/3.le 13 6.5e12/1.6e13 -
2.0e 13/l.6e 13 2.9e12/9.0e12 -
l.8e 12/l.4e 12 1.9e 11/7 .8e 11 -
6.2e08/4.6e08 2.3e08/4.6e08 -
1.9el3/1.3el3 2.0el3/4.8e12 2.8e12/4.0e11 
6.7e12/4.0el2 5.8e12/L4e12 l.Oe12/ L5e11 
2.7e12/1.5el2 L8el2/4.5e1l 5.0ell/5.0el0 
2.8e 11/ 1.6ell 2.3e11/5.8el0 5.0el0/6.0e09 
L9e08/ 1.2e08 2. 7e08/7 .le07 5.0e07 /7 .Oe06 
8.7e12/7.0el2 8.7e12/3.5e12 -
2.8e 12/2.1e 12 2.4e12/LOe12 -
l.le12/7.6ell 7.4e11/3.2e11 -
1.2e11/8.7el0 9.9e10/4.lel0 -
8. 9e0717 .3e07 1 ?.eOR/5.2e07 -
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Table 11 (Page 10 of 13). DEMO Jl>lanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
• In solidbreedermaterial (Bq/kg) 
- breeding region midp1ane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s L5e14/2.7e14 
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- breeding regiontotal average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s 4.8el3/4.5el3 
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
• In solid multiplier (beryllium) (Bq/kg) 
- breeding region midp1ane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s 
-/3.0e14 
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y -
=> after 500 y -
- in breeding regiontotal average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 y -
=> after 10 y 
-
=> after 500 v -
BOT DC wc 
Lle14/8.2el3 na na 
2.5e11/L9ell na na 
Lle10/8.7e09 na na 
L2e09 /9 .6e08 na na 
L6e08/ L2e08 na na 
3.6el3/2.7el3 na na 
9.4e 10j7.0e 10 na na 
4.0e09/2.9e09 na na 
4.3e08/3.2e08 na na 
5.7e07/4.3e07 na na 
3.2e14/2.7el4 na na 
L5el3/L2el3 na na 
L3el3/Llel3 na na 
7.5e12/6.3el2 na na 
4.4e08/3.4e08 na na 
L2e14/Llel4 na na 
4.9e12/4.3el2 na na 
4.0e12/3.5el2 na na 
2.4e12/2.lel2 na na 
2.0e08/ 1.6e08 na na 
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Table 11 (Page 11 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
• In liquid breeder (Bq/kg) 
- mixed mean (from circulation) ib/ob 
=> after 0 s na 
=> after 1 d na 
=> after 1 y na 
=> after 10 y na 
=> after 500 y na 
11. Afterbeat Production after 0 s, 1 h, 1 d, 1 month, 1 y 
• in structural material ( Wf cl7i') 
- In first wall region midpiane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- first wall region total average ib I ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- breeding region midpiane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after I h -
=> after I d -
=> after I month -
=> ;~fter 1 v -
BOT DC wc 
na 3.3el3/3.3e13 -
na 6.9eii/7.0eii -
na 
I 
3.2e09/3.0e09 -
na 3.7e08/3.8e08 -
na 4.8e06/3.9e06 -
8.9e-I/ l.OeO 7.4e-I/8.4e-1 7.5e-I/l.Oe0 
6.3e-lj7.Ie-I 5.2e-I/5.9e-l 5.0e-l/7 .Oe- I 
7.8e-2/8.8e-2 7.0e-2/7.9e-2 6.5e-2/9.0e-2 
6.4e-2/7 .3e-2 5.9e-2/6.6e-2 5.0e-2/7.0e-2 
2.9e-2j3.3e-2 2.5e-2/2.9e-2 -
4.2e-l/4.7e-I 3.2e-1/5.8e-l -
3.0e-lj3.4e-1 2.2e-l/5.8e-l -
3.6e-2/4.1e-2 3.0e-2/5.4e-2 -
2.9e-2/3.3e-2 2.5e-2/4.5e-2 -
1.3e-2jl.5e-2 l.le-2/2.0e-2 -
4.0e-l/3.3e-I 6.5e-2/5.5e-2 -
2.9e-I/2.3e-I 4.6e-2/3.9e-2 -
3.3e-2/2.7e-2 5.2e-3/5.8e-3 -
2.6e-2/2.Ie-2 3.8e-3/4.7e-3 -
l.2e-219.6e-3 1.8e-3!2.0e-2 _ 
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Table 11 (Page 12 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts data sheets 
Item BIT 
- breeding regiontotal average ibjob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- shie1d region midp1ane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- shield region total average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
• In solidbreedermaterial (Wfcrril) 
- breeding region midp1ane average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- breeding regiontotal average ib/ob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after_l v -
BOT DC wc 
L8e-1/ L4e-1 2.8e-2/3.7e-2 -
L3e-1/9.9e-2 2.0e-2/2.8e-2 -
L4e-2/Lle-2 2.0e-3/3.8e-3 -
Lle-2/8.3e-3 L4e-3/3.le-3 -I 
5.2e-3/4.0e-3 I 6. 9e-4/ L3e-3 -
3.8e-2/2.6e-2 4.le-2/9.7e-3 Lle-3/ L5e-3 
2.8e-2/ L9e-2 3.0e-2/7.1e-3 7.5e-4/ l.Oe-3 
2.8e-3/ L9e-3 2.4e-3/5.6e-4 4.5e-5/6.5e-5 
2.0e-3/ L4e-3 L5e-3/3.5e-4 2.8e-5/4.0e-5 
Lle-3j7.8e-4 9 .3e-4/2.2e-4 -
L7e-2/L4e-2 L8e-2j7.0e-3 -
L3e-2/ Ll e-2 L3e-2/5.1e-3 -
L2e-3/9.7e-4 LOe-3/4.0e-4 -
8.7e-4/6.9e-4 6.6e-4/2.5e-4 -
4.9e-4/4.0e-4 4.1e-4/ L5e-4 -
L7e-1/L3e-1 na na 
L6e-3/ L2e-3 na na 
2.6e-4/2.0e-4 na na 
5.0e-6/3.9e-6 na na 
7.4e-7/5.5e-7 na na 
8.5e-2/4.3e-2 na na 
L4e-3/5.3e-4 na na 
L5e-4(7.1e-5 na na 
2.6e-6/ L3e-6 na na 
AJ1e-1L2J1e-7 na na 
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Table 11 (Page 13 of 13). DEMO blanket concepts dall:a sheets 
Item BIT 
• In solid multiplier (beryllium) (Wfcrril) 
- breeding region midp1ane average ibjob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
- breeding regiontotal average ibjob 
=> after 0 s -
=> after 1 h -
=> after 1 d -
=> after 1 month -
=> after 1 y -
• In liquid breeder (Wfcrril) 
- mixed mean (from circulation) ib/ob 
=> after 0 s na 
=> after 1 h na 
=> after 1 d na 
=> after 1 month na 
=> ::~fter 1 v na 
BOT DC \VC 
L3e-1/ l.le-1 na na 
9.7e-4j7.7e-4 na na 
3.5e-4/2.9e-4 na na 
9.4e-5j7.7e-5 na na 
4.6e-5/3.6e-5 na na 
5.8e-2/4.4e-2 na na 
5.8e-4/3.5e-4 na na 
1. 6e-4/ 1.2e-4 na na 
3.6e-5/3.1e-5 na na 
1.7e-5/ 1.5e-5 na na 
I 
na I, 7.6e-2f7.7e-2 -
na 2.2e-3/2.le-3 -
na 3.9e-4/4.0e-4 -
na 1.3e-5/1.2e-5 -
na 2. 7e-6/l. 9e-6 -
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Figure 1. Vertical cross section of the DEMO reactor equipped with the BIT blanket. 
(reproduced from [1]) 
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Figure 2. Outboard midplane cross secti011 of the BIT blanket. 
(reproduced from [l]) 
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Figure 3. VerticaJ cross section of the DEMO reactor equipped with the BOT bJanket. 
(rcproduced from [2]) 
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Figure 4. Isometrie view of the BOT hlanket ( outboard segment). 
(reproduced from [2]) 
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Figure 5. Vertical cross sectimt of the DEMO reactor equipped with the DC blanket. 
(reproduced from [3]) 
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Figure 6. Isometrie view of the DC blanket (outboard segment). 
(reproduced from [3]) 
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Figure 7. Vertical cross sectior1 of the DEMO reactor equipped with the WC blanket. 
(reproduced from [ 4]) 
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Figure 8. Isometrie view of the WC blanket (outboard segment). 
(reproduced from [4]) 
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